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ABSTRACT 
Defense planning has always been one of the most sensitive issues in promoting 
civilian control of the armed forces. Ensuring democratic control of defense policy is a 
challenging task, and Southeastern Europe’s (SEE) experience to date has inevitably been 
mixed. At this phase of the reform process, some countries from the region do not 
possess the necessary civilian knowledge to replace the dominance of the armed forces in 
the defense planning process.  
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of efforts to establish civilian 
democratic control over defense planning in three SEE countries. Its purpose is to 
contribute to a better understanding of the importance and the role of civilians, especially 
elected leaders in defense planning, and to search for models of defense planning systems 
that are most appropriate for countries that have very limited defense capabilities.  
This thesis argues that the use of a defense planning system with the necessary 
civilian control may result in the establishment of a modern, effective military. This 
thesis focuses mainly on the experience of three countries: Romania, Bulgaria and 
Republic of Moldova. It looks at the achievements and major challenges that these 
countries still face to establish greater professional civil-military cooperation and 
effective civilian control over defense planning. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Defense planning has always been one of the most sensitive issues in promoting 
civilian control of the armed forces. Ensuring democratic control of defense planning is a 
challenging task and Southeastern Europe’s (SEE) experience to date has inevitably been 
mixed. At this phase of the reform process, some countries from this region do not 
possess the necessary civilian expertise and experience to replace the dominance of the 
armed forces in the defense planning process. The questions addressed by this research 
are: How do these countries address this challenge, and how can they improve civil-
military cooperation in this field?  How effective are the implications of civilians and 
especially elected leaders in defense planning? This thesis tries to answer these questions 
by presenting major successes and failures of some SEE countries in establishing a 
modern defense planning system adequate to the democratic political system. 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
importance and the role of civilians, especially elected leaders in defense planning, 
focusing on the difference in and complementary roles civilians and militaries play in 
defense planning. This thesis mainly focuses on the experience of three countries: 
Romania, Bulgaria and Republic of Moldova. It looks at the achievements and the major 
challenges that these countries still face to establish constructive professional civil-
military cooperation and effective civilian control over defense planning. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The transition to democracy and good governance cannot avoid dealing with the 
central problem of building defense planning systems under strong civilian democratic 
control. After the end of the Cold War, the defense planning system in almost every 
Southeastern European country was challenged by these major political changes. The 
new security environment stressed the necessity to significantly modify the defense 
planning process in transitional countries. Demands for building armed forces, which are 
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under democratic control, have caused radical changes in the nature of civil-military 
relations. This particularly affected the SEE countries where existing legacy almost non-
existent defense planning systems need to be replaced with transparent, effective, 
efficient and compatible ones.1 
The importance of the research question derives from the theoretical and practical 
approach to the problem. From the theoretical approach this thesis will identify the 
indicators that measure the success or failure that distinguishes successful civilian control 
over defense planning. The research attempts to explain why some of the countries have 
been more successful in this process than others, and have succeeded in building defense 
planning systems with required characteristics, while in some SEE countries there is still 
significant room for consolidation and improvement in this area.  
From the practical approach, this thesis attempts to suggest some models of 
defense planning systems for countries that try to improve effectiveness and efficiency in 
the defense planning process.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Within this research the author will argue that the use of a modern defense 
planning system with the necessary civilian control may result in the establishment of a 
modern, effective military. The problems identified, and the common challenges, in the 
area of civilian control of defense planning that are shared by countries in Southeast 
Europe include a lack of expertise and experience on the part of civilian defense officials, 
and a lack of civilian and military partnership in defense planning. 
Lack of expertise and experience on the part of civilian defense officials in 
defense planning issues sometimes leads to inappropriate policy choices and 
politicization of the military. Due to the lack of experienced and well-prepared civilians 
that can undertake reforms, programs in defense planning are not being realized. There 
are also certain forms of politicization in the security sector, unclear statements of 
                                                 
1Zrnić Bojan, “The New Trends in Defense Planning and their Impact on the Defense Planning 
Systems in Transitional Countries,” Voino Delo 1 (2008). 
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national interests and goals, promotion of inadequate or unrealistic decisions and an 
inability to form a consistent defense policy. These have all been evident in the SEE 
governments’ attempts to adopt major security and national documents and laws. 
Moreover, in most countries in the region, there is an absence of a knowledgeable 
political elite that shows an ability to establish effective and efficient governmental 
structures and effective planning norms.2 
A lack of civilian and military partnership in the defense planning agenda can also 
lead to inappropriate military interference over elements of defense planning that may 
have detrimental consequences.  As George Cristian and Mihaela Matei noticed:  
Now it is common sense that planning for a certain type of command-and-
control system or asserting certain operational rules of engagement has 
inner political implications and must therefore be analyzed and endorsed 
by the civilian leadership despite the fact that previously defense planning 
was perceived as being entirely the province of the military.  Both military 
and civilian leadership had to face the task of redefining the role and shape 
of the armed forces in a new environment, one where the absence of 
clearly defined external threats has complicated the heretofore classical 
approaches to plans and scenarios in force building.3 
This thesis also intends to find examples of successful planning systems that 
should be studied and followed for a specific country, identify models that should apply 
to countries in transition, and how they can improve their planning. How can countries 
with modest capabilities work in a modern system and what are the steps to take? The 
aim is to identify the trends in the defense planning area, to analyze the impact of civilian 
control on these trends in transitional countries, and to propose a generic model of the 
defense planning system suitable for the transitional countries. 
                                                 
2Islam Yusufi, “Understanding the Process of Security Reform in Southeastern Europe,” Journal of 
Security Sector Management (June 2004): 13. 
3George Christian Maior and Mihaela Matei, “Bridging the Gap in Civil Military Relations in 
Southeastern Europe,” Mediterannean Quarterly (Spring 2003): 73. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research is based on literature from several fields: civil-military relations, 
defense planning, comparative politics, security sector reform, defense economics, and 
international relations. 
Until the end of the Cold War the specific situation of the defense and security 
sector in Southeast Europe did not allow for the development of independent and 
professional research on the topic of democratic control of armed forces and defense 
structures. Consequently, by the early 1990s, no theoretical establishment of civil-
military relations existed that applied specifically to the SEE region. Initially, the civil-
military relations debate was dominated by the contributions of scholars whose analytical 
focus concentrated on West European and North American traditions and experiences, 
and who have analyzed the evolution of the democratic control in those countries. 
Concerning defense planning as a subject, there is little attention in the literature on this 
matter and, consequently, there is a significant gap in the professional and academic 
literature. Defense planning in this view is a contested process in which civilians and 
military officers often work at cross-purposes. With regards to the literature dealing with 
both civil-military relations and defense planning, it is very vague; these two fields of 
research are considered to be separate areas of investigation. This thesis tries to combine 
these two areas and present civil-military relations as a factor that influences considerable 
defense planning. 
Much of the literature on the subject of civil-military relations argues that tensions 
between civilian and military leaders are unavoidable due to different backgrounds, 
interests and outlooks of the two groups.4 Until now, most debates on civil-military 
relations were articulated on the basis of the assumptions of Huntington and Janowitz’s 
classical theories on the civil-military gap, which was reinterpreted after the end of the 
Cold War by introducing other factors into the analysis, such as the consequences of 
                                                 
4Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social 
and Poitical Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); and Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the 
Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
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shrinking and professionalizing the military establishment, the emergence of new risks 
and threats, and the redefinition of armed forces’ missions. The substance of this cultural 
gap between the military and civilian leadership also constitutes a point of dispute 
between academics and policy makers.  
After the Cold War ended, the military’s traditional role in many Western and 
non-Western countries was questioned in this regard. A recent study argues that, “after 
the end of the Cold War, democratization and globalization have had a big role in 
determining the timing and sequence of defense reform and the consequent impact on 
civil-military relations.”5 
After analyzing the existing literature the author has concluded that an adequate 
defense planning system does not exist in SEE countries. Consequently, in order to 
implement the new defense planning system based on planning, programming, budgeting 
and execution methodology, it is necessary to develop a new defense planning concept 
considering trends such as capability-based planning, output-oriented budgeting, as well 
as “best practice” in their own experience and in the experience of other transitional 
countries. Some studies dedicated to defense planning6 were very insightful in regards to 
identifying the problems and lessons learned in this field. Of great help were Center of 
Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) Reports that offer a detailed evaluation on status of 
defense policy, planning and execution in the countries examined in this thesis. 




                                                 
5Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, Global Politics of Defense Reform (New York, NY: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008). 
6Thomas Durell Young, “Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: Techniques Applicable to NATO and 
Partnership for Peace Countries,” The Quarterly Journal 5, no. 2 (Summer 2006); Aldo Kask, Jaan 
Murumets and Thomas Young, “Approaching the Need for Defense Reform: Background and Outlines of 
Suggested Estonian Defense Planning System,” in Proceedings (Estonian National Defense College, 2003). 
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issues by Sharon Caudle7 and Paul Davis8 were also helpful in order to understand the 
new planning methodology and the importance of institutions in order to implement 
defense planning. The former argues that CBP implementation offers unique challenges 
because of differences between homeland security and the defense community. 
The available literature dealing with civil-military relations and defense planning 
in SEE is very vague. Only a few of the studies refer to Southeastern Europe. There were 
some studies, by Constantine P. Demopoulos and Daniel Ziker;9 Jean Callaghan and 
Jürgen Kuhlmann;10 Philipp H. Fluri, Gustave E. Gustenau and Plamen I. Pantev;11 Juan 
J. Linz and Alfred Stepan;12and Rachel A. Epstein,13 but each had a narrow focus. They 
dealt with either some specific issues of civil-military relations or focused on a particular 
country, and none of them dealt with both areas of research: civil-military relations and 
defense planning. 
To better understand the research problem, this thesis proposes to examine the 
question by doing a comparative case study. In this order, a more detailed field-related 
analysis is provided. It analyzes and details the major successes and failures of three SEE 
countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of Moldova) in establishing a modern defense 
planning system, supportive of a democratic political system. Scientific articles and 
                                                 
7 See: Sharon Caudle, “Homeland Security: Approaches to Results Management,” Public Performance 
and Management Review 28, no. 3 (March 2005); and Sharon Caudle, “Homeland Security Capabilities 
Based Planning: Lessons from the Defense Community,” Homeland Security Affairs I, no. 2 (2005). 
8Paul Davis, “New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough,” RAND 
(National Defense Research Institute), 1994; Paul Davis, “Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based 
Planning, Mission System Analysis, and Transformation,” RAND (National Defense Research Institute), 
2002; Paul Davis, Russel D. Shaver and Justin Beck, “Portfolio- Analysis: Methods for Assessing 
Capability Options,” RAND (National Defense Research Institute), 2008. 
9Constantine Panos Danopoulos and Daniel Ziker, The Military and Society in the Former Eastern 
Bloc (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999). 
10Jean Callaghan and Jürgen Kuhlmann, Military and Society in 21st Century Europe (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000). 
11Phillip Fluri, Gustav E. Gustenau and Plamen Pantev, The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in 
South East Europe : Continuing Democratic Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism, 1st 
Edition (Heidelberg, NY: Physica-Verlag, 2005). 
12J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidations- Southern 
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
13Rachel A. Epstein, In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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official publications from these countries provided resourceful insights in accomplishing 
this task.14 Although the Southeastern European countries are discussed by civil-military 
relations theories, the case of the Republic of Moldova is neglected. The Moldova case is 
analyzed in this research through the eyes of some contributions of scholarly articles 
published by Moldovan policy makers, strategy papers issued by expert’s structures from 
Moldova,15 research of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of armed Forces 
(DCAF), and on the contribution of scholars from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
in Monterey, California. 
In the current security environment the civilian sector must better understand and 
address the needs of the armed forces. In turn, the armed forces must further accept that 
there is a leading role for civilians in the formulation of defense policy. As Clausewitz 
wrote, “Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details,” but it can 
be felt “in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even on the battle.” The 
bottom line is that any major military development considered by the commander should 
be reviewed by the statesman to determine potential policy implications.16 As a result, 
military and civilians must interact to continuously contour the course of events. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The aim of this thesis is to fill the gap of our understanding of the difference and 
complementary roles civilians and militaries play in defense planning by providing a 
comparative study on how Bulgaria, Romania, and Republic of Moldova succeeded or 
failed in establishing professional civil-military cooperation and effective civilian control 
over defense planning. Thus, a detailed, field-related analysis is provided. 
                                                 
14M. Zulean, “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern Europe,” Mediterannean 
Quarterly(Spring 2004); Valeri Ratchev, “Context Scenarios in Long-Term Defense Planning,” 
Information and Security: An International Journal 23, no. 1 (2009): 62-72; and Nicu Ionel Sava, Western 
(NATO/PfP) Assistance to Build Democratic Civil-Miitary Relations in South Eastern Europe: The Case of 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia, Final Report (Bucharest: The Manfred Wörner Fellowship 2001-2002, 
November 2002). 
15Eric Sportel and Sami Faltas, “Security Sector Reform in Moldova: Strengthening Oversight over 
the Security Sector,” 2009. 
16Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 606–608. 
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For the purpose of cross-national comparison an analytical framework was 
employed to assess the progress made and problems faced by the SEE countries in 
establishing a viable defense planning system (regarded as an independent variable) 
adequate to the new realities. The suggested analytical framework argues that the use of a 
defense planning system with the necessary civilian control may result in the 
establishment of a modern, effective military (considered in this framework as a 
dependent variable). The framework suggests that a range of factors influence the defense 
planning system in any given country: clear government policy, adequate organizational 
structures (coordination between the civilian and military defense planning 
organizations), and adequate financial resources (to acquire long-term capabilities).  
Also, the research studies the modern defense planning systems and their force 
development methodologies, concluding with an analysis of the lessons from other 
countries that can be useful or applied to countries in transition.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Four major chapters comprise this thesis. Following the Introductory chapter, 
Chapter II is devoted to an overview of basic concepts such as democratic control, 
oversight and military effectiveness in defense planning process. The thesis provides the 
reader with some conceptual clarifications and draws a framework of analysis. It provides 
a basis for understanding the concepts of democratic control, military effectiveness, 
defense planning, etc. It also introduces a relatively new planning methodology that is 
gaining increasing currency in Europe—Capability Based Programming (CBP). 
Chapter III examines the defense planning reform and the dimension of civilian 
control over that process in three SEE countries: Bulgaria, Romania, and Republic of 
Moldova. It examines the changes in defense planning after the end of the Cold War in 
these countries. In order to better understand the progress registered throughout the last 
sixteen years of defense planning reform and the challenges regarding civil-military 
relations in SEE countries, a brief return to the legacies of communism is essential.  
The research also focuses on those aspects that are significant for Southeastern 
Europe. It arranges them in three main areas: first, the factors that influenced new trends 
 9
in defense planning; second, the current relevance of the civil-military contradiction in 
defense planning; and finally, the gap between civil and military culture within 
Southeastern Europe and the opportunities to overcome it. All of these aspects will be 
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II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS AND 
THE RELEVANCE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL, OVERSIGHT AND 
EFFECTIVNESS OF THE MILITARY 
A. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
One can pose the question: What is political and what is military? It should be 
stated from the very beginning that all major issues in military, in one way or another, 
have a fundamental political value. On the issue of civilian control, Clausewitz wrote that 
“[p]olicy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details,” but it can be felt 
“[i]n the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even on the battle,” stating that any 
major military development considered by the commander should be reviewed by the 
politician to determine potential policy implication.17 In order to facilitate an 
understanding of civilian implication in defense planning, this chapter starts with some 
basic clarifications of civil-military relations and moves towards defense planning 
definitions.  
1. Civil-Military Relations Paradigms 
The current paradigm of the civil-military relations study is still dominated by 
some works that date from the early Cold War period, that are associated with the books 
of Samuel Huntington18 and Morris Janowitz,19 which have been more than sufficiently 
reviewed and criticized over the years20 and are not useful under the present 
                                                 
17 Von Clausevitz, On War, p. 606–608 
18 Huntington, The Soldier and the State. 
19 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. 
20Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 149–178 ; and Eliot A. Cohen, 
Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster 
Inc., 2002). 
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circumstances, nor are they useful for the purpose of this thesis.21A new generation of 
scholars expressed frustration with the old Huntington and Janowitz theoretical 
frameworks and came forward with some new alternatives.22 These authors made 
important contributions to our understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations, 
but the problem is that they focused only on democratic civilian control over the security 
forces; in this regard an additional focus is needed on their effectiveness and efficiency. 
In an attempt to conceptualize civil-military relations in the contemporary world, this 
thesis will look at a new conceptualization of civil-military relations, proposed by 
Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristina Matei, which deals with three dimensions: the 
civil-military relations trinity of democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency23 (the 
last dimension is not examined by the authors). 
These two dimensions are mainly used by democratically elected leaders to 
exercise control over defense planning process. 
                                                 
21For example: Huntington’s formulation is problematic, first of all because it is “closely linked to the 
US democratic experience, of questionable relevance elsewhere in the world.” Huntington advanced his 
notions of “objective” and “subjective” control explicitly around the assumption of a clear separation of 
responsibilities betweenthe civil and military sectors with the military having a clearly defined, 
autonomous and professionalized area of responsibility, exclusively concerned with the management and 
application of force. So he argues that the military mind is static. The author totally disagrees with this 
assumption and considers that military mind is very dynamic, and Huntington is wrong.  The author thinks 
that Huntington provided a good theory study but not an empirical one. 
22For example: Deborah Avant came with the interpretation of “effect of divided versus unified 
principal on military compliance with doctrinal change”, and the role of private contracting and its effect on 
civil military relation; for more see: Avant, Deborah D. 1996/1997. ‘‘Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of 
Control? Why the U.S. Military is Averse to Responding to post-ColdWar Low-Level Threats.” Security 
Studies. 6(2): pp. 51–90.Peter Feaver came with the paradigm that laid out an agency theory of civil-
military relations, which he argued should replace Huntington's institutional theory. He proposes an 
ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian 
executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state. Taking a 
rationalist approach, he used a principal-agent framework, to explore how actors in a superior position 
influence those in a subordinate role. He used the concepts of “working” and “shirking” to explain the 
actions of the subordinate. For more see: Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington., p.231). 
Other authors like Weiner (1995), Zegart (1996), and Brooks (1999) also used the principal agent approach 
to explore variations in how political military institutions are formed and reformed. Another contribution to 
literature on civil-military relations is made by Michael Desch, who talks about the importance of external 
threats in influencing military intervention in politics and the impact of this factor on civil-military 
relations. Desch suggests that there is a variable relationship between the strength of civilian control of the 
armed forces and levels of internal and external threats. For more see: Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control 
of the Military: The Changing Security Environment. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 
2001. 
23Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristina Florin Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 13, no. 5 (December 2006): 776–790. 
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These authors claim that a new re-conceptualization of civil-military relations is 
needed, in the sense that such conceptualization is helpful to the “understanding of the 
large and more complex relationships concerning democracy and security, particularly 
considering the wider spectrum of roles and missions.”24T. Bruneau also emphasized the 
utility of new institutionalism25as the tool for the conceptualization in the study of civil-
military relations.  In his assessment of new institutionalism, T. Bruneau highlights the 
fundamental role that institutions play in shaping national security policy and civilian 
control on defense planning process.  
2. Defining Civil-Military Relations: Elements Necessary for Defense 
Planning 
For the purpose of this thesis, the author looks at the following civil-military 
relations elements: democratic civilian control oversight and military effectiveness.  
a. Democratic Civilian Control and Oversight 
The first dimension of the civil-military relations trinity to be analyzed is 
democratic civilian control and oversight.26 Strong civilian democratic control is the 
main element for a sound defense planning system, especially for the countries in 
transition to democracy and good governance. Oversight focuses on resource and 
organizational management, professional expertise, and the establishment of a security 
community within civil society. Oversight as the civilians actually keeps track of what 
the armed forces or other security forces do; if they are in fact following the direction and 
guidance they receive. 
                                                 
24Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization.” p.910. 
25New institutionalism is a theory that seeks to elucidate the role that institutions play in the 
determination of social and political outcomes. For more details see: Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. 
Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Insitutionalism,” Political Studies, 1996: 936. 
26We conceptualize “democratic civilian control “in Bruneau’s framework, as:”[a]uthority over the 
institutional control mechanisms, oversight and professional norms”. An institutional control mechanism 
refers to “the institutions in place to control the three instruments of security. These include a wide 
spectrum beginning with a clear legal basis, ministries of defense, committees in parliaments with authority 
over policy and budgets, national security councils, and officer promotion processes.”Thomas C. Bruneau,  
and Matei Florina Cristiana (Cris). “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-
Military Relations.” Democratization 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 916. 
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The process of civilian control over defense planning in SEE region went 
through three interrelated stages of development. Initially, these countries followed a top-
down approach by establishing the legal framework for implementing civilian control and 
reorganizing military institutions to comply with the democratic requirements of the 
Constitution. A second stage ensured the appropriate creation and implementation of 
legal provisions, specifically regarding defense-planning processes. Finally, in the third 
stage, policy-makers have started to address the broader issue of military-transformation 
integration within the overall security sector’s reform efforts.  
Until 1989, countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of Moldova 
were entirely part of the Communist bloc and used typical “Communist models of 
civilian control.” “Communist (or authoritarian) models are characterized by the 
following traits: 
 A relatively confusing legal framework, meant to consolidate not 
only the formal, but also the informal power of the Communist 
Party’s leadership; 
 A focus on coercion rather than consent in implementing and 
legitimizing policies, ensuring the Communist Party’s control over 
the armed forces;  
 A (mostly conscription-based) military establishment whose 
leaders held significant political influence; 
 An authoritarian political system, concentrating the power in the 
publicly unaccountable leadership of the Communist Party; 
 A virtually non-existent civil society.”27 
Starting in the1990s, these countries started to adopt a “Western model of 
civilian control over the armed forces.” Western (or liberal) models of civilian control 
over the military are based on the view that “[t]he armed forces are by nature  
 
 
                                                 
27 Philipp Fluri and Eden Cole, “DCAF's Activities in Support of Effective and Democratically 
Transparent Defense Planning,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal V, no. 1 (2006): 5. 
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hierarchical structures and thus inherently undemocratic and, for that reason, have to be 
brought under democratic control.” These models are also characterized by several key 
features:  
 A relatively clear legal and/or institutional framework regulating 
the relationship between civilian authorities and the military; A 
democratic political system, providing the mechanisms to ensure 
the free expression of people’s will in a majority of situations and 
to facilitate public scrutiny of military actions;  
 A (mostly professional) military recognizing the legitimacy of the 
political system and the rule of law, and acknowledging the need 
for its own political neutrality as an institution (i.e., politically 
nonpartisan);  
 The subordination of the armed forces (i.e., the General/Defense 
Staff) to the Government, through a civilian-led 
Ministry/Department of (National) Defense, and to the civilian 
Head of State (i.e., a clear chain of command, with civilian leaders 
at its top), and a significant role for the Parliament in making 
decisions on military (especially budgetary) issues; 
 The existence of a civil society, involved in a public debate on 
military issues.” 28 
They agreed to abandon the previous Communist models of oversight, due 
to the transformation of the international strategic environment and the new nature of 
their domestic political systems. They have promoted the idea of a profound 
transformation of their civil-military relations, yet that has not happened as smoothly as 
initially predicted, and this aspect will be covered better in Chapter III. Nevertheless, in 
most Southeastern European countries, the formal changes have fundamentally altered 
the way military leaders and civilians interact when dealing with security and defense 
issues. 
                                                 
28Philipp Fluri and Eden Cole,” DCAF's Activities in Support”: 6. 
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As the following chapter will demonstrate, throughout generations of 
defense planning reform, SEE countries examined in this thesis made consistent progress 
in establishing a legal and institutional framework,29enforcing healthy civil-military 
relations and implementing the principles of democratic oversight, transparency and 
accountability, and also creating the institutional framework. However, the existence of 
constitutional and legal arrangements or the creation of institutional frameworks does not 
necessarily guarantee the appropriate implementation of the existing legislation and the 
actual exercise of civilian control through the means available to democratic societies: the 
elected representatives, parliamentary defense commissions, media and citizens. 
However, the adoption of these principles, procedures and structures in no way implies 
that, when combined, they will produce military efficiency, let alone effectiveness.   
In this context, we can conclude that setting up civilian control over 
defense planning is relatively easy and all countries investigated have done so. Military 
effectiveness is, however, not assured. The case of Bulgaria appears to be one of the most 
successful cases. The Romania and Moldavian cases suggest lower rates of success. The 
main problems being:   
 An executive which has first to learn about transparent planning 
cycles and gain self-confidence in the implementation; 
 A legislative power which needs to learn about guidance and 
oversight mechanisms; a national media and institutions of civil 
society which need to change their expectations from commenting 
on the successes of authoritarian leadership to the assumption of 
the responsibility for public oversight.30 
                                                 
29Within the civil-military relations framework, the principal organizations involved in this process 
are- the Office of the President, Parliament, Government, the Minister of Defense, the MoD components, 
National Security Councils. These institutions would interact as follows: The President-Parliament- 
Government- NSC- civil society. 
30Philipp Fluri and Eden Cole, “DCAF's Activities in Support of Effective and Democratically 
Transparent Defense Planning,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal V, no. 1 (2006): 5. 
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b. Military Effectiveness 
This refers to whether the military can actually fulfill the roles and 
missions assigned to it by the civilian leadership, and the means by which a democracy 
exercises civilian control over its armed forces. The question of measuring effectiveness 
to see how successful the defense and security reforms are in the new democracies of 
Southeastern Europe, or to improve them, is nevertheless an extremely difficult task. The 
question of effectiveness is very acute today. In the current environment many countries 
are embracing peacekeeping and peacemaking as justifications for preserving their armed 
forces.  
3. Defense Planning Conceptual Overview 
Defense planning has always been one of the most sensitive issues in promoting 
civilian oversight of the armed forces. One of the main problems in civil-military 
relations has been introducing any fundamentally new concepts for defense planning, 
particularly ones that extend the limits of civilian expertise in order to address areas that 
had been considered exclusively within the realm of the military. The problem with better 
understanding this concept and the defense planning methodologies is that there is a 
significant gap in the professional and academic literature on this matter.31 As Talbot 
effectively pointed out, “the defense planning is and will remain an uncertain 
enterprise.”32 
a. Defense Planning vs. Operational Planning 
Some analysts associate defense planning with: 
the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It supports 
preparations for war, the conduct of operations in situations less than, and 
involves the planning necessary to recruit, organize, train, equip and 
provide military forces. It comprises the processes of strategic and 
                                                 
31 Young, “Capabilities-Based Defense Planning.”  
32Imlay Talbot and Monica Toft Duffy,The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic 
Planning Under Uncertainty, ed. Imlay Talbot and Monica Toft Duffy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 
p. 4. 
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programmatic planning and represents the main tools for the 
transformation of national defense objectives and available resources into 
the comprehensive set of military capabilities needed for the future 
security environment.33 
George Cristian and Mihaela Matei describe defense planning “as the 
process of establishing a state’s defense policy and pursuing its objectives through the 
involvement of the military on the international and/or internal arena, the distribution of 
defense resources, and the development of domestic institutional systems of 
cooperation;”34 or in other words, it is a complex area that seeks to ensure that a defense 
system has the necessary forces, assets, facilities, and capabilities to fulfill its tasks 
throughout the full spectrum of possible missions. For a better understanding of the 
defense planning process it is intended to place the definitions, used in this research, in a 
broader context, by also embracing operational planning and the relationship between 
defense and operational planning. 
For example, Zrnić Bojan distinguishes three areas of the defense planning 
realm:  
the development of national strategies and policies or strategic planning, 
the development of defense programs or programmatic planning and 
operations or military planning. Strategic planning usually provides broad 
strategic goals, describes risks and threats, declares policies and defines 
available resources and constraints. Operational planning develops the 
courses of action, which determines how to use different military 
capabilities in order to achieve a government’s declared objectives. 
Programmatic planning is a bridge between strategic and operations 
planning and it is a process for balancing and integrating resources among 
the various defense programs in order to build the desired capabilities.35 
It is important to point out that there are strong interdependency and soft borders between 
the particular planning levels.  
                                                 
33Zrnic Bojan, “The New Trends in Defense Planning and their Impact on teh Defense Planning 
Systems in Transitional Countries,” Voino Delo 1 (2008): 26. 
34 Cristian and Matei, “Bridging the Gap in Civil Military Relations,” p.60. 
35 Bojan, “The New Trends in Defense Planning,” p.26. 
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Holger Pfeiffer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defence 
Policy and Planning of NATO, defines defense planning as “the planning activity that 
deals with establishing and maintaining armed forces over time, so that they are available 
when needed,” and operational planning is “about employing and deploying them.”36 He 
also broke them down into more specific disciplines: operational planning, for example, 
into contingency planning or crisis response planning, and defense planning into force 
planning, armaments planning, logistics planning and a number of others.37 At the same 
time, the NATO Glossary of Standardization Terms and Definitions proposes the 
following definition for defense planning: “The political and military process used by 
nations to provide the capabilities needed to meet their defense commitments.”38 As for 
operational planning, there are no NATO agreed definitions, only some explanations of 
the terms in agreed documents, which could serve as informal definitions.39 In this 
context, operational planning is a compartment of a strategic work plan, defined by Kask, 
Murumets, and Youngas a process that:  
is carried out within a strategic framework and seeks to translate strategic 
guidance and direction into a scheduled series of integrated military 
actions that are to be carried out by forces to achieve strategic objectives 
efficiently and with acceptable risks. At the strategic level, operational 
planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and 
tasks in support of the National Security Concept (and National Military 
Strategy) and the development of the force and materiel requirements 
necessary to accomplish those tasks.40 
It describes short-term ways of achieving milestones and explains how a strategic plan 
will be put into operation during a given operational period.   
Taking into account the vague and broad spectrum of definitions 
proposed, in order to assess what defense planning and operational meaning means, we 
                                                 
36Holger Pfeiffer, “Defense and Force Planning in Historical Perspective: NATO as a Case Study,” 
Baltic Security & Defense Review 10 (2008): 104. 
Ibid., 105. 
38NATO, NATO Glossary of Standardization Terms and Definitions (2007). 
39NATO, “NATO's Operational Planning System,” http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf (accessed 
February 22, 2011). 
40 Kask et al., “Approaching the Need for Defense Reform,” p.9. 
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should go beyond the classical approach. Defense institutions should be less threat-
oriented and more security capability-oriented to reflect a policy shift from “defense 
against others” to “security with others” in Daniel Nelson’s terms.41 Both militaries and 
civilians have to face the task of redefining the role and shape of the armed forces in a 
new environment. They have to answer to the following questions in assessing a new 
paradigm in defense planning: Against whom is defense planning aimed? What are the 
needs of the country? Who are potential enemies?  And what are the capabilities 
required? 
b. Defense Planning Methodologies: Classic vs. Modern Methods 
There are different approaches to defense planning. Among those there are 
two that are well recognized: threat-based planning and capability based planning.  
(1)  The Classic (Cold War) Defense Planning Approach.  Defense 
planning during the Cold War was dominated by threat-based planning (TPB). Its main 
characteristics are: 
 The system responds to an identifiable threat, meaning that 
the enemy was not uncertain. In the case of the Cold War, it 
was the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union; 
 Resources were relatively stable, they were not subject to 
radical changes; 
 The area of operation was clear: it was Central Europe; 
 Threats were quantifiable; 
 Defense planning implies policy approval and guidance.42 
The idea of threat-based planning was that using threats as 
requirements would lead to the appropriate capabilities. Davis argues that there were as 
well other considerations, but the bounding threat was a core concept taught to and used 
                                                 
41Daniel Nelson, “Beyond Defense Planning,” Paper, Workshop on Transparency in Defense Policy, 
Military Budgeting, and Procurement (Sofia, 2001), 17–20. 
42Carl H. Builder and James A. Dewar, “A Time for Planning? If Not Now, When?” Parameters, 
Summer 1994: 6. 
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by generations of planners.43 Until recently most of the countries examined in this 
research (Bulgaria and Romania) largely employed variations on TBP.  
(2)  Modern Defense Planning.  As previously mentioned, the Cold 
War planning era dealt largely with symmetric threats, but with the end of the Cold War 
this all changed.  What was once predictable became very unpredictable. In place of a 
one dominant threat that can be used as a benchmark for measuring everything else, a 
number of possible threats arose.  The “symmetric threats” were now “asymmetric 
threats,”44 if even threats at all. 
The change from a predictable, symmetrical threat to the 
unpredictable, asymmetrical threat environment considerably affected the defense 
planning process. It impelled a shift from TBP to CBP. 
Previously, individual threats played the central role in defense 
planning. Currently CBP has become a central theme of defense planning. The 
characteristics of CBP are: 
 This system responds to an unclear threat, the enemy in this 
context is no longer certain; 
 Threats are not quantifiable; 
 Resources are uncertain; 
 The area of operation is no longer clear; 
 The method requires continuous policy guidance that shifts 
priorities.45 
CBP puts integrated capability packages and not individual 
systems at the center of a more adaptive defense planning. From an earlier predominant 
focus on systems, now it is the common idea of capabilities as combinations of elements 
that have to be brought together to get things done.  In this context, capability is defined 
                                                 
43Paul Davis, “New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough,” RAND 
(National Defense Research Institute), 1994, p. 6. 
44 Ibid., 16–39. 
45 Builder, “A Time for Planning?” p 6 
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as a “quantitatively measurable capacity of each defense forces structural element to 
perform a given task under specified conditions up to established standards.”46Thus, the 
main trend in this definition is away from purely material, towards more conceptual 
capabilities. 
In this context, CBP has become the “gold standard” of defense 
planning. The main idea behind CBP is probably still best formulated by Paul Davis of 
RAND: “[C]apabilities-based planning is planning, under uncertainty, to provide 
capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while 
working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.”47 This definition and 
CBP’s key elements are still widely accepted but opinions differ about it details and how 
to implement it.  CBP’s key elements include: 
 A conceptual framework for planning under uncertainty by 
emphasizing flexibility, robustness, and adaptiveness of 
capability; 
 An analytical framework with three components: 
understanding capability needs, assessing capability options 
at the level of mission or operation, choosing capability 
levels and choosing among capability options in an 
integrative portfolio framework that considers other factors, 
different types of risk, and economic limitations;  
 A solution framework that emphasizes: “building 
blocks.”48 
According to the “Guide to Capability Based Planning,” this 
system has several major building blocks: 
 “CBP is output oriented, it must have high-level capability 
objectives derived from government guidance; 
                                                 
46 Kask et al., “Approaching the Need for Defense Reform,” p.9. 
47 Davis, “New Challenges for Defense Planning,” p. 8. 
48 Davis, Paul. “Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission System Analysis, and 
Transformation.” RAND (National Defense Research Institute), 2002. 
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 CBP needs to consider the way in which the force will 
fight.  This generally takes the form of top-level doctrine or 
some overarching operational concept; 
 CBP uses standard groupings - capability clusters or 
capability partitions to make the process more manageable; 
 The resulting capabilities are realized within available 
resources. 
 It starts with the overarching guidance, identifies capability 
gaps, explores options and ends with an affordable 
investment plan. In the CBP process, there are two groups 
that are involved: decision-makers and defense planners.  
 Decision-makers are usually senior government officials 
and defense leadership. This is the group responsible for 
making decisions about trade-offs in defense capability 
development. Decision-makers will generally be interested 
in information such as how they can achieve their strategic 
objectives, what risk is there for defense due to various 
decisions or constraints and the impact of choosing a 
portfolio of options on capability.  
 Defense planners include the groups of planners who are 
required to implement the chosen initiatives and projects. 
They want to provide the best options to achieve capability 
goals and need to understand the synergies between their 
options and the rest of defense capability.”49 (see Figure 1 
below) 
Figure 1 below depicts a process chart of CBP. 
                                                 




Figure 1.   Generic Process Chart of Capability Based Planning50 
B. CONCLUSION 
As this section demonstrated, understanding of basic concepts and relationships 
concerning the issue of civilians’ responsibilities for, and influences on, the defense 
planning process is fundamental, especially for the SEE region—a region where many 
defense establishments still struggle with fully implementing the concepts of defense 
policy, defense planning, the concept of “capability” (vs. “systems”), and understanding 
of the proper and essential role played by civilians in defense planning. Highlighting the 
conceptual clarifications is important for the goal of the research, namely measuring 
success or failure of civilian control over defense planning in SEE countries. 
Although defense planning and civil-military relations are usually considered 
separate, specialized fields of research, this chapter presented civil-military relations as a 
general factor that perforce influences defense planning. It started by providing a basis 
                                                 
50 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), Guide to Capability-Based Planning (Alexandria, VA, 
2004), p. 4. 
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for understanding the concepts of democratic control, oversight and military effectiveness 
in defense planning process. In order to better understand the CMR in a modern world, 
the chapter looked at a new conceptualization of CMR, proposed by Thomas C. Bruneau 
and Florina Cristina Matei, which deals with three dimensions: democratic control, 
effectiveness and efficiency. This study focuses primarily on the two dimensions of 
democratic civil military relations: issue of civilian control over defense planning process 
and military effectiveness over defense planning process, and not on the broader topic of 
civil-military relations.51 
This chapter also introduced a planning methodology that is frequently discussed, 
but is little understood. The planning methodology under consideration is capability 
based planning. The chapter provided a definition of capabilities based planning and then 
in Chapter IV it will relate capabilities based planning to the objective of transforming 
SEE forces to deal effectively with the changes taking place in military affairs. 
Given the above, the chapter looked at the capability based planning approach 
adopted in many EU and NATO countries. In the countries covered by this research, only 
Bulgaria has recently adopted this methodology. This approach was promoted in the 2010 
Force Structure Review (FSR) with the intention to replace an integration of the single 
service vision of necessary capabilities. Small countries, like those examined in this 
research, have a hard time mustering this type of defense planning. However, at the same 
time they are encouraged by some successful examples (see the Australian example)52 
that demonstrate that even a smaller, or medium, and quite active defense institution can 
still manage to facilitate effective defense planning. The attractiveness of the CBP system 
is that the system will make civilian defense leadership aware of the clear costs/benefits 
implications of their decisions that must balance effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
                                                 
51 The first dimension, civil democratic control, should be validated by defense policy and planning, 
which includes defining the military’s role, shaping resource allocation, and evaluating the results. 
Effectiveness is determined by whether or not a state is prepared to fulfill the security forces major roles 
and missions. For more details see: Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana (Cris) Florina Matei, “Towards a 
New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 
(December 2008): 17. 
52 Young, Capabilities-Based Defense Planning.” 
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III. DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM IN SOUTHEASTERN 
EUROPE AND CIVILIAN CONTROL AS A KEY REQUIREMENT 
FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE PLANNING 
A. DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM IN SEE 
After the end of the Cold War, defense systems in Southeastern European 
countries were challenged by the significant changes that occurred. The nature of the 
contemporary security environment, as well as permanent pressure on the limited 
resources, demands the reform of the defense systems both in developed and transitional 
countries. Demands for building armed forces which are under democratic control and 
prepared for Euro-Atlantic integration have caused radical changes in the nature of civil-
military relations in the these countries. This is particularly significant in the area of 
defense planning where systems should have been replaced with transparent, effective, 
efficient, and compatible ones. Some of the transitional countries were more successful in 
this process than others and succeeded in building the defense planning system with the 
practically required characteristics. However, for different reasons, in the greater number 
of transitional countries there is significant room for consolidation and improvement in 
this area. 
This chapter examines the defense planning reform and the dimension of the 
civilian control over that process in three SEE countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Republic 
of Moldova. Two of these states, Bulgaria and Romania, joined NATO in March 2004 
and EU in 2007. The other one, Republic of Moldova, is aspiring for EU membership.  
The Bulgarian and Romanian defense planning reform process is presented as an example 
of a relatively successful defense planning reform among NATO and EU countries. The 
achievements and problems in civil-military relations in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
countries and the role of defense planning in this process are shown in the Republic of 
Moldova case. This chapter deals with the period of time from the revolutionary changes 
of 1989 to the present. 
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1. Background Leading to Defense Planning Reform and the Dynamics 
of CMR 
With the end of the Cold War, the main reason behind huge investments in armed 
forces disappeared. Today, most militaries are struggling to justify their budgets and size. 
Due to these changes, militaries are finding it difficult to define their current and future 
role and missions.53 At the beginning of the 1990s, new realities such as: changes in the 
strategic security environment (different challenges and different missions), new 
definitions of risks and threats, and the ineffective management of national defense 
imposed a defense planning reform in SEE countries. In this context, most of these 
countries found themselves needing to adapt their heavily oversized defense 
establishments to the post-Cold War realities, without having adequate national 
procedures, tools, and expertise. In regards to the civil-military relations aspect, most 
Southeastern European countries have superficially adopted, since 1989, Western models 
of civilian oversight of the military, formally abandoning their previous Communist 
models. The combination of Western paradigms, Communist legacies, and pre-
Communist patterns of civil-military relations since 1989 have led to new, hybrid forms 
of civilian control over the armed forces.54 In most cases, the problem that appeared was 
not the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces or the separation of the 
military from politics, but rather that of the effective execution of democratic governance 
of defense in relation to the defense planning process, and the effective engagement of 
civil-society in a framework of democratic legitimacy and accountability. 
a. The Legacies of Communism in SEE 
In order to understand the dynamics of defense planning reform and the 
impact of civilians in this process, it is necessary to briefly introduce the legacy factor. 
Historical legacies matter heavily in most countries, but none more so than in the SEE 
                                                 
53 Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic 
Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin, TX: University of Texas 
Press, 2008), p.74. 
54 Dragoslav Popa, “Civilian Control Over Military in Romania and Bulgaria (1989–2004),” in 
Transforming National Armed Forces in South-East Europe- From the Social to the Military Challenge, 
(Vienna: National Defense Academy of Vienna, 2004), p.79. 
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region. The past decade has witnessed the constant ambiguous and non-uniform transition 
from authoritarian governments and centrally planned economies to pluralist democracies 
and free-market economies. These countries were almost equally disadvantaged with 
inefficient governing and planning legacies. The inefficiency of the Soviet planning 
system and its centralized control and execution of plans is well known and still affects 
countries that grew up in the Soviet generation. Soviet military systems, as Ronald S. 
Mangum and William J. Craven well pointed out in their paper: 
[w]ere long on directives and short on detailed planning, long on 
establishing accountability and short on giving authority, long on checks 
and balances and short on encouraging ingenuity – in short, a system that 
strangles itself and kills the enthusiasm of its inhabitants.55 
Others problems that these countries faced were:  
[b]ureaucratic resistance against change, especially from the General 
Staff; the lack of experience among the military in planning, programming 
and budgeting; the shortage of expertise among civilians within the 
defense establishment and security agencies; little interest on security and 
defense matters; and the lack of an appropriate legislative framework for 
carrying out reform etc.56 
Democratic consolidation of some of these countries (in particular in 
Moldova), including civil-military relations and defense reform is still plagued by these 
Soviet/Communist legacies. 
b. Defense Planning Trends after the Cold War in SEE 
At the beginning of the 1990s the defense planning system in the countries 
investigated in this thesis were characterized by following trends: 
 Defense planning was fully centralized by Moscow. Warsaw Pact 
countries had either no or very limited knowledge and experience 
                                                 
55 Ronald S. Mangum and William Craven, “Measuring Defense Reform,” Small Wars Journal, April 
2010: 5. 
56 Adrian Pop, “Romania: Reforming the Security Sector,” in Security-Sector Reform and 
Transparency-Building Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, (Groningen: Centre for European 
Security Studies (CESS), 2004), 49. 
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in defense policy and planning. The exception was Romania, who 
was not fully integrated into the Warsaw Pact C2 structure and was 
outside of their centralized planning system; 
 SEE countries largely employed variations on threat-based 
planning. The military culture of defense planning was very much 
related to Cold War thinking concerning the dominant role played 
by threat assessments, strategic theaters of deployment, and the use 
of mass-conscript militaries;   
 Even under the impact of declining economies and the lack of an 
obvious enemy, senior political and military leaders felt safer 
adhering to inherited force structures and force development 
models. One result is that, at the time of their accession to NATO, 
very few of the new alliance members had any sizeable 
contribution to make to the Alliance’s capabilities.”57 
 Weak civilian control on defense planning process. The notion of 
the democratic civilian control over the armed forces was slowly 
introduced, but General Staffs remained the primary organizations, 
if not the only ones, thinking how to adapt military establishments 
to the 1990s security environment. According to Philipp Fluri and 
Eden Cole, defense planning in transitional states had struggled 
with the same problems:  
[a]n executive which has first to learn about transparent planning cycles 
and gain self-confidence in the implementation thereof; a legislative 
power which needs to learn about guidance and oversight mechanisms; 
and national media and institutions of civil society which need to change 
their expectations from commenting on the successes of authoritarian 
leadership to the assumption of the responsibility for public oversight.58 
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In this realm, one SEE country (the Republic of Moldova) had to start 
from scratch in defense planning; whilst others (Bulgaria and Romania) had to overcome 
the burden of mass armies and faced the problem of downsizing before reform could 
start. Also, they understood that the best option to redefine their position and to transform 
would be to become full members of Western structures. However, in order to be 
accepted into organizations such as NATO or the EU, candidate countries have to, at the 
very least, initiate extensive programs of reform in most fields based on Western 
guidelines.59 The need for their association to NATO was expressed by the two countries 
(Romania and Bulgaria) in the mid-1990s, when they considered much more seriously 
the idea of formally applying for NATO membership. Consequently, European and Euro-
Atlantic politico-military organizations have become directly involved in the process of 
transformation of the relationship between the military establishment and political forces 
in Southeastern European countries. 
In this process, all countries examined in this chapter benefited, in some 
way, from foreign guidance and assistance, in particular from NATO’s PfP and the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) programs. NATO programs assisted these countries to 
undertake necessary defense management reforms, such as: transparent national defense 
planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation and parliamentary 
and public accountability. The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and PfP 
exercises introduced them to collective defense planning and pave the way for more 
detailed operational planning.60 Romania and Bulgaria have experienced PfP and MAP 
assistance in full while Republic of Moldova benefits from PfP assistance.  
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2. Defense Planning Reforms and CMR Progress in SEE 
The need for defense planning reform in the SEE countries is explained by the 
following factors: the changing geopolitical situation that generates new realities and 
risks, new opportunities for international cooperation in the field of defense and security, 
imperfections in the state’s existing defense planning systems, or its non-existence 
(Republic of Moldova), the need to adjust the countries defense and foreign policies to 
this basic principle and the intention to correlate defense and security systems with the 
real financial and material resources and possibilities of the states, and the need to re-size, 
rationalize, and re-invest in the force. 
Since the early 1990s, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Republic of Moldova have 
been engaged in reforming their legal frameworks dealing with security and defense 
issues. In all cases, the principle of democratic civilian control over the armed forces was 
incorporated into their Constitutions, adopted in 1991 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 1994 
(Republic of Moldova).61 More specific legal provisions were provided several years 
later. Except for the laws on defense (1994 and 1995 in Romania and Bulgaria, 
respectively; for Republic of Moldova much more recently in 2003), more significant 
changes have been made only in the late 1990s. The pace of change during the post-
Communist period has been slow and the content of the legal frameworks resulting from 
this process, although democratic in essence, has been relatively vague. All three 
Constitutions also lack a clear division of power amongst the various actors involved in 
the system exercising civilian control over the armed forces. This leaves enough room for 
the military to impose their viewpoints on defense issues. Moreover, this situation creates 
confusion about the precise responsibilities of civilian institutions in the fields of security 
and defense.  
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In almost all SEE countries, waves of reform have followed each other since 
1991. Three different waves can be readily distinguished: 
 “The “downsizing wave of 1990-1995,” predominantly cost-motivated; 
 The NATO oriented phase of 1996-2001. It was characterized by a 
conceptual and strategic transformation of the military in order to face an 
expanded spectrum of tasks. PfP extended the notion of “security through 
participation” to the entire continent.  
 The third wave of reform, currently taking place since 2001, aims at 
structural modularization combined with a comprehensive 
professionalization.”62 
The existing defense institutions of the countries examined in this paper were 
either inherited or imported from the former Soviet Union arrangements and procedures 
governing the defense sector, and adapted to the requirements of independent states in 
transition to democracy and free market economies. 
a. Bulgaria: Example of Relatively Successful Defense Planning 
Reform 
During the Soviet era, the Bulgarian military structure was involved in 
domestic politics, and officers were often affiliated with political parties. Bulgaria lacked 
a substantial pool of civilian defense experts, and professional military personnel did not 
recognize the legitimate viewpoints of civilian officials. The lack of understanding 
between civilian and military components led to conflict between the two, thus impeding 
constructive cooperation on reforming the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF). Other 
obstacles to reform were the internal resistance of key people in General Staff and the 
armed services because they felt threatened by down-sizing and restructuring, the lack of 
competent people to implement changes systematically, the constraint of limited 
resources, and a huge infrastructure that was difficult to maintain. 
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The defense planning reform in Bulgaria has known four phases.  The 
Adaptation Phase (1989-1998) marked an initial legislative and institutional 
approximation of the requirements of the democratic principle.63The system existing at 
that time had several major deficiencies:  
no holistic but rather a 'mosaic' approach to defense planning, no long-
term assessment and the traditional understanding of planning among the 
Bulgarian military, who perceived ‘operational planning’ –  as a highly 
classified activity carried out by few, highly expert military officers of the 
General Staff of the country’s armed forces.64 
The Bulgarian thinking on defense reform started in approximately 1991. In 1995 the 
Cabinet approved a draft Concept for National Security, followed by a Concept for 
Reforming the Bulgarian Army until the Year 2010. But, until 1995, the attention of 
Bulgarian politicians towards defense was insignificant; in 1996—the year of the 
economic crisis—defense was not even on their agenda. In 1998, the Cabinet approved a 
top-secret plan for reforming the military establishment, known as Plan 2010.65 In sum, 
although defense policy was subject to civilian control, in principle civilians in 
parliament and government lacked sufficient expertise to establish a defense planning 
process, or to assess principal defense planning decisions. 
The real change in Bulgaria started in 1997 when the government decided 
to apply to join NATO. The model of defense planning implemented in Bulgaria in 1998 
was a product of both internal and external factors, domestic willingness and NATO  
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persistence. Since autumn of 1998, the establishment and the effective functioning of a 
vigorous system for defense planning was one of the emphases in Ministry of Defense 
(MoD) activity.66 
The Second Phase (1999-2003) was characterized by the establishment of 
a rudimentary defense planning system and the initiation of the first Strategic Defense 
Review (SDR) in 2001 that resulted in the Adapted Plan 2004.  The failure of this plan 
was due, in large part, to the fact that the former version was not publicly debated and in 
the end, lacked full government oversight.67 After the first SDR, a first White Paper was 
published in 2002, along with the first Defence Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria. It is 
worth mentioning that the principal objective set in the first White Paper was not 
achieved. The Bulgarian Army’s organization-building and modernization plans were not 
developed with optimal consideration to the state’s ability to guarantee the resources 
necessary for their practical implementation. Many decisions were taken without deep 
analysis  and secured resources.68 
The Third Phase (2003-present) is known as Transformation Planning. In 
2004 a formal SDR was conducted. Bulgaria’s 2004 SDR set a timeframe for the 
reduction of the BAF from 45, 000 to 39,800 by 2015. As of 2010, the current active total 
stands at 44, 100 (of which 78.7% are military and 21.3% are civilians).69 The 
weaknesses of this SDR were manifested by the fact that the modernization plan that it 
proposed—Plan 2015—was officially acknowledged in 2008 as being unsupportable. 
Reasons for planning implementation failure are: the lack of clear policy directives and 
priorities, inaccurate cost analysis/the lack of proper cost data, the inability of the current 
MoD to create effective and precise policy to guidance planning, the challenge of having 
a legacy force structure that was not necessarily supportive of new missions and 
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supporting tasks, and the possible misunderstanding that national defense planning is not 
similar either in content, or its development process, to operational planning. In 2010 a 
new, disciplined and thorough Force Structure Review was conducted. The main results 
of this review and the resulting guidelines for political and practical action were 
presented in the White Paper on Defense and Armed Forces.70 At the time of this writing, 
an “Armed Forces Development Plan” is under development. The defense planning 
methodology currently introduced and in use now is capabilities based planning. 
In conclusion we can state that in the case of Bulgaria defense reform can 
be characterized as being painful, relatively slow, but not yet unsuccessful. Lost years 
were followed by radical and deep reforms, though their ultimate success at reform 
remains to be proven.  
b. Romania: Achievements and Problems 
When speaking about Romania’s planning reform process and the 
dynamics of civil-military relations, it is worth mentioning that Romania has been 
undergoing a major review and reform of the armed forces, seeking to achieve both 
dimensions of T. Bruneau’s framework of democratic civil-military relations.71 As Cris 
Matei well pointed out:  
Democratizing and professionalizing Romania’s armed forces has 
therefore been an onerous process, which involved an overhauling of the 
legal framework on defense and security, coupled with systematic changes 
in structure, organization, recruitment, personnel, promotion, 
management, accountability and transparency, all in all to make the armed 
forces better prepared for post-Cold War security risks.72 
In Romania, as well in the other case studies examined in this thesis, the 
legacy of the Communist past at the end of the Cold War was enormous and omnipresent. 
During the Communist regime Romania’s armed forces lost their power and influence. 
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The Ceausescu policies led to a de-professionalization of the military.73 Since the 1989 
Revolution, the defense sector has been one of the most challenged sectors in Romania. 
However, in comparison with other armed forces examined in this thesis, the Romanian 
defense forces seemed better prepared to cooperate with Western partners after 1989.  
The defense planning reform in Romania has known four phases, which 
are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
The First Phase (1990–1999) saw the adaptation of laws and governmental 
decisions that regulate the foundation, organization and functioning of various military 
bodies, as well as Romanian’s international military relations and participation in PfP and 
peacekeeping missions.  Also in 1997, the missions of the armed forces abandoned the 
concept of “mass armies” and territorial defense of 1989, and adopted policies that sought 
to develop a more flexible and affordable army, which was cut to about half of its initial 
military strength, reaching a peacetime active force of 163,523 soldiers, of which 76,345 
were conscripts.74 The National Security Strategy (NSS) was finally adopted in 1999 by 
Parliament, creating a coherent framework for security sector reform and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. 
Regarding civilian control over defense planning at that stage, Romania 
followed a top-down approach by establishing the legal framework for implementing 
civilian control and re-organizing the military institution to comply with the democratic 
requirements of the Constitution. This period was dominated by establishing institutions 
and improving legal bases for defense,75 as well as the appointment of the two first 
civilians in command positions within the military system: a Deputy Director of the 
National Defense College, and respectively, a deputy Minister of Defense.76 During this 
period, an important catalyst was the 1999-adopted NATO Membership Action Plans 
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(MAP). In 1998, Romania issued a Government Ordinance on Romania’s National 
Defense Planning, which set up the legal framework for defense planning. 
During the Second Phase (2000–2003), according to the requirements of 
the NSS (1999), a “Romanian Armed Forces Restructuring and Modernization Concept” 
and an “Action Plan for the Concept Implementation” were issued. The purpose was to 
design a new military capability and adequate structure.  During this period the force 
structure was made operational at the minimum required level (an objective cited by the 
PfP Planning and Review Process).Also, Romania adopted a defense budgetary system 
based on DoD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) methodology.   
The first National Military Strategy was adopted in 2000 and this 
document established new missions for the Armed Forces in accordance with the NATO 
New Strategic Concept.77 The activity regarding defense planning was developed 
according to Law Nr.63/2000 for the approval of the government ordinance Nr.52/1998 
regarding Romania’s national defense planning.78 
Also in 2001, the Defense Integrated Planning Directorate was established 
and placed under civilian defense leadership (the State Secretary for Defense Policy and 
Euro-Atlantic Integration Department). Until then, the planning and allocation of 
resources was the responsibility of J5/General Staff.  
The goals of the Third Phase (2004–2007) were to modernize the armed 
forces procurement planning and execution processes, fulfill the operational capability of 
the established structures at the planned level, and complete the major procurement 
programs.  
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Heavily influenced by the U.S. defense planning studies, Romania's Army 
Reform 2004 envisions reducing the armed forces. The Supreme Council 
of National Defense approved the maximum number of the Armed Forces 
to 140.000, of whom 112.000 military personnel and 28.000 civilians.79 
At that stage, policy-makers started to address the broader issue of military 
transformation integration within the overall security sector’s reform efforts.80 In this 
context, an SDR was conducted. In 2008, the MoD has launched another attempt to 
conduct an SDR, which has met opposition from the General Staff.81 
The Fourth Phase (2007-present) shows relative progress in the 
development of defense planning system. A threat-based planning methodology is still 
being used, but there is a tendency to introduce the capability-based planning system. As 
a first step towards capability-based planning, a new National Defense Strategy has just 
been drafted and is currently heavily debated in the media. Since the executive and 
legislative branches are more preoccupied with the current economic crisis and budgetary 
cuts, it may take some time until these projects will become reality. 
c. The Challenges of Defense Planning Reform in the PfP 
Countries: The Republic of Moldova Case 
Democratic defense planning is in its infancy for the Republic of 
Moldova. Currently, there are very weak structural defense planning methods in place. 
The legal framework for the Republic of Moldova’s defense organization is provided by 
the Law on National Defense, adopted in 2003.82 The National Defense Law of Moldova 
does not integrate a unique legislative concept and provides only some aspects related to 
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the tasks and competencies of the central public authorities in the organization of defense 
planning. In this context, it is worth mentioning that existing legislation on security and 
defense is ill-defined with respect to arrangements which have been established for the 
purpose of justifying a preference for a certain size or type of military force, for its 
missions and the capabilities the military should develop.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and, respectively, the proclamation 
of independence, the Moldovan Armed Forces (MAF) have been formed from what was 
inherited from the former Soviet Army: corruption, consolidated political power, the lack 
of a political culture, Soviet military mentality, weak professional skills, and an attitude 
to the service which were incompatible to the new realities.  
The need to reform the national army became clear during the conflict 
over the region of “Transnistria”83 in 1991 and 1992.84 “Transnistrian separatists fought a 
brief war with Moldovan forces in 1992, and a contingent of approximately 1,500 
Russian soldiers continues to serve in Transnistria, ostensibly as peacekeepers and 
guardians of an estimated 20,000 tons of Soviet era weapons and ammunition. In 1999, 
Russia pledged to remove this equipment, but withdrawals ceased in 2004. Although 
tensions remain, little political violence has ensued since the conflict, and residents of 
Transnistria and Moldova proper experience relative ethnic homogeneity and regularized 
contact compared to other Eurasian frozen conflicts. Nonetheless, Transnistria overtly 
seeks integration with Russia, and formal status negotiations (the ‘‘Five plus Two’’ talks) 
held under the auspices of the OSCE have been stalled since 2006.”   
Overall, the defense planning reform in Moldova, which started in 1991, 
has had three phases. 
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(1)  First Phase (1991–1997).  As aforementioned, the MAF were 
formed out of the ruins of the former Soviet Army: a highly political power, a Soviet 
military mentality and views, which has timely proved to be incompatible with new 
international and national security realities. As a result, the MAF remained a mirror 
reflection in many key ways of the former Soviet Army.  A series of reforms were 
initiated to change the military, but without a previous methodological and detailed 
assessment of the existing state of the military security system or security needs, and 
without sufficient civilian expertise.85 Military reform was rather an internal MoD 
initiative.86 
In 1992, when the MoD was established and the first Moldovan 
Minister of Defense was appointed, new defense legislation was passed (Law on Defense, 
Law on the Armed Forces and the Law on Military Obligation and Military Service by 
the Citizens of the Republic of Moldova). These laws established new roles and missions 
for the MAF, the organization and activity of the Moldovan defense sector, and the rights 
of the bodies of state power and state administration.87 
The Constitution adopted in 1994 set forth the basic principles 
governing civilian and democratic control and oversight of the armed forces.88 This led to 
the development and adoption by the Moldovan Parliament of the key normative acts that 
regulated the system (system presumes institutions, responsibilities, and chain of 
command) of national security. In this framework, the National Security Concept and 
Military Doctrine were adopted in 1995. Also,co-operation with the military political 
structures of NATO through PfP program89 was launched while in 1995,an Individual  
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Partnership Plan (IPP) was signed between Moldova and NATO. In this framework, in 
summer of 1996, Moldovan military contingents participated for the first time in PfP 
exercises in Ukraine and in Bulgaria. 
Civil-military relations, in particular civilian control was emerging, 
yet it was far from being effective. For example, although at that time President Mircea 
Snegur in his capacity as a Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, issued a decree of 
removing Division General Pavel Creanga from his position on the grounds of 
incompetence and corruption, the Constitutional Court ruled against the presidential 
decree.90 That political case revealed the fragility of political command and control 
system of the armed forces as well as weakness of democratic control and oversight over 
the defense sector.  
(2)  Second Phase (1997–2004).  During this stage, the 
appointment, in 1997 of the first civilian Minister of Defense91 was a positive 
breakthrough in the democratic civil-military relations in Moldova. In addition, the 
concepts of civilian control of the armed forces and democratic military reform were 
introduced to Moldovan society by the elected leaders. In this context, in 1997 the National 
Army joined the PfP PARP. After having joined this process, Moldova agreed to a series 
of interoperability goals with NATO, related to identified forces and means in order to be 
made available within multinational peacekeeping operations.92 This period also saw the 
approval by the Parliament in 2002 of a reform plan, “Military Reform Concept,”93 that 
recognized that the Armed Forces were in poor condition due to the lack of practical 
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experience in the area of military construction and management, lack of general 
expertise, an insufficiency of funds; all of which had a profound effect on the structure of 
defense planning, funding, administration and organization. This concept stated also that 
“democratic command and control of the armed forces” would be a key area of 
cooperation with other armed forces.94 
Also, during this period (May 2004) the Supreme Security Council 
of Moldova approved “The Concept of Restructuring and the Modernization of the 
National Army to 2014,” which was developed in the framework of a Defense Reform 
Concept. The 2004 Document established a conceptual basis for the development and 
implementation of state defense programs and plans. However, it should mention that, 
during this period, both concepts have been very difficult to fully implement due to a 
structural lack of funds, low priority of the defense sector, and the lack of strategic 
expertise among many politicians to understand the complexity of defense reform in a 
democratic and free market economy country.  
(3)  Third Phase (2005-present).  This period is characterized by 
the creation of a civilian and military command structure of the armed forces with a 
detailed delimitation of its attributes in the political, administrative and military 
command spheres.  
During this stage, Moldova has taken more security sector reform 
initiatives; yet, success continues to elude it. These initiatives include the ratification of 
an Action Plan with EU (2005) and an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with 
NATO (2006). The adoption of these tools led Moldova in a serious dialog with Euro-
Atlantic institutions regarding co-operation and defense sector reform with the West. In 
fact, a comprehensive plan for security sector reform was developed in the framework of 
in the IPAP. This set out a plan for the renewal and reform of national security 
institutions. Regretfully, Moldova’s political elite didn’t realize at that time the 
seriousness of these undertakings; i.e., the complexity and the difficulty of implementing 
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these plans. As a result, in the opinion of many national security experts, these reforms 
were led in the wrong direction, adopting only “cosmetic democratic elements.” 
Furthermore, the reforms were not completed in accordance with declared 
commitments.95 
Luckily, during this period the Republic of Moldova also benefited 
and continues to profit from external technical assistance. Experts from the NPS in 
Monterey, CA, United States (CCMR), as well as civilian and military advisors from 
NATO and its partner states have been assisting Moldova in its reform efforts. With the 
assistance of UK experts (Security Sector and Defense Assistance Team, SSDAT) and 
representatives of the CCMR, the first Strategic Defense Review (SDR) was launched. 
The State Commission for Strategic Defense Analysis was created for this purpose by the 
Moldovan Government. For the first time, representatives from the civil society were 
invited to participate at the meetings of this Commission.96 The SDR objective has been 
to conduct a detailed inventory of the entire defense system, which will assist Moldova’s 
political leadership realistically to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system in 
regard to facing threats and challenges by national security. The final results of the SDR 
should produce conceptual and organizational changes in the development of defense 
institutional framework and capabilities; ideally, these should be adopted by political 
leadership in order to meet the security needs of the state. At the current stage, based on 
the SDR methodologies, the Commission with assistance of international experts has 
developed two interim reports: one on the current capabilities of the Armed Forces, and 
the other on the legal and regulatory defense.97 The final document is in the process of 
being reviewed and agreed by government.  
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Beyond assisting Moldova in its reform process, another key 
objective of partners’ support has been to develop the ability and capability of the 22nd 
Peacekeeping Battalion to operate together with forces from NATO and partners’ 
countries, especially in international crisis-management and peacekeeping operations as 
well as to assist in developing a new training program for the armed forces.98According 
to the Moldovan Chief of the Land Forces Command, the 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion is 
going to be reorganized in the next two years and “the National Army will get a force 
always ready to interfere, trained in compliance with Western requirements contributing 
to different peacekeeping missions.”99 
In conclusion, it is obvious that the defense planning reform in Moldova, 
despite scattered initiatives of interested leaders and foreign involvement and support 
(including PfP), has to date proven to be very difficult to implement due to several 
factors: a lack of funds,100 poor governance, and the inertia of old approaches, lack of 
political will, and conservative tendencies that still remain very visible.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The transition from Communist to Western frameworks has not been an easy 
process in SEE countries. The results of this transformation are sometimes obscure, and 
the effectiveness of the new provisions in terms of ensuring civilian control over the 
military is not always clear. In this context, at the end of 1989 the combination of 
communist legacy with issues such as ineffective political leadership of the countries 
transformation processes towards functional democracies and market economy, the legal 
and institutional inconsistencies on the execution of the national chain of command of the 
Armed Forces; combined with the lack of professionalism and expertise of both civilian 
                                                 
98 NATO, “NATO’s Relations with the Republic of Moldova,” NATO Topics, February 24, 2009, 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-moldova/index.html (accessed February 20, 2011). 
99 Moldova azi- Tara pe Internet, “The 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion to be Reorganized in the 
Following Two Years,” Politics, DECCA Press, May 20, 2010, http://www.azi.md/en/print-story/11378 
(accessed February 20, 2011). 
100 Currently a great percentage of the defense budget goes to salary and entitlements, leaving very 
little discretionary resources for maintenance and modernization effort. 
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authorities and military leadership caused the delay of the implementation of effective 
civilian direction and democratic oversight of the defense planning system.   
However, the decision by SEE countries to join European and Euro-Atlantic 
structures has led to the creation of specific dynamics involving systemic changes in 
defense planning processes. Nevertheless, the processes of transformation have not led 
every time to the expected outcomes designed by Western and even SEE political 
architects. Often, the programs of reform have been set up and implemented because the 
West has required them (e.g., the Romania case). Regarding the issue of oversight of the 
military, one has to mention that the governments in the countries examined in this thesis 
have promoted it as a priority specifically because European and Euro-Atlantic 
organizations have defined it as such. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the desire for integration with NATO or EU 
has been a powerful factor influencing SEE civil-military relations and defense planning 
reform. But membership in NATO (in Romania and Bulgaria case) does not solve the 
problem of creating democratically accountable armed forces. Democratic control and 
effectiveness are living processes not discrete events. The domestic economic context 
has, however, made defense reforms difficult. Despite this, institutional mechanisms for 
effective democratic control of the military have been put in place. More work is needed 
in order to develop democratic civil-military relations in the areas of defense policy, 
defense budget planning, and in professionalizing civilian knowledge of the military. The 
main areas of further improvement are: 
developing capabilities for better cost estimation, the refinement of 
different data bases for support of the programming phase, an introduction 
of the business management tools in order to improve the execution and 
evaluation phase and development of an adequate selection and training 
process for personnel involved in the defense planning process on 
different levels.101 
                                                 
101 Bojan, “The New Trends in Defense Planning,” 38–39. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE GENERAL STATE OF 
DEFENSE PLANNING IN BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND REPUBLIC 
OF MOLDOVA AND THE ROLE OF ELECTED LEADERS IN 
DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As previously discussed, under the pressure of uncertainties of the new strategic 
environment, combined with radically changed financial priorities, currently defense 
planning has become an interest of elected leaders, and they have started to think and act 
in new ways. They have understood the need of being better prepared to balance national 
agendas with collective security arrangements, find the right proportion between civil 
domestic concerns, and adequate military budget. Participation in peace operations and 
international initiatives has also generated new types of civil-military communications 
and co-operation between elected leaders and their military counterparts, which crated 
new thinking and perception both within the military and within the civil society. The 
involvement of elected leaders in defense planning is important especially in the new 
security environment, where what it is built today may not be appropriate tomorrow. In 
this context an increased civilian oversight and responsibility within the defense planning 
process are more necessary than ever. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the major achievements and challenges 
of SEE countries in establishing a modern defense planning system adequate to the 
democratic political system. This chapter focuses mainly on the contemporary defense 
planning systems which are capability-based planning in the sense of establishing 
objectives, output-oriented in the budget sense, and are program based in the sense of 
attempting to link available resources to desired capabilities.   
This section takes a more detailed look at the Bulgarian, Romania, and Moldavian 
experiences in establishing effective civilian control over defense planning.  The focus is 
on both the difference and the complementary roles civilians and militaries play in  
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defense planning. Further, the thesis documents where the referents examined for this 
study currently stand in this difficult and slow transition to valid capabilities-based 
planning. 
B. OUTLINE OF THE BULGARIAN, ROMANIAN, AND MOLDOVIAN 
DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS 
After the political changes in Europe (1990), the process of establishing a new 
defense planning system in SEE countries was slow-going and uncertain, due in part to 
the lack of experience and expertise from both civilians and militaries, and also due to the 
general lack of the new concepts of defense planning. In a contemporary setting, 
politicians and military planners started to think about the possible consequences of the 
change on military postures. This lead to an attempt in almost all of the countries 
examined in this research to review their defense planning system and to develop new 
defense planning methods, which include political guidance, military tasks derived from 
the former, as well as adequate financial resources. 
1. Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian defense planning system is in the process of adopting capabilities-
based planning system. In this research, the Bulgaria case is presented as an example of a 
relatively successful defence planning system among the new NATO countries. 
According to the CCMR survey of the defense policy, planning, programming, and 
budgeting system of the Bulgarian MoD and Armed Forces “Bulgaria has the basic 
elements of a Western defense policy, planning, and programming system; but critical 
tools and procedures remain to be adopted.”102Currently, the redesign of the defense 
planning process in Bulgaria is still a priority task for both civilians and military officials.  
The Bulgarian defense planning process relies upon two main guidance 
documents: the Government four-year programs and MoD Annual guidance 
                                                 
102 “Status of Defense Policy, Planning and Programming in the Republic of Bulgaria,” CCMR Report 
(July 28–29, 2008). 
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document,”103 (overtaken by the White Book and White Paper). Based on these 
documents, defense planners produce plans. A central emphasis of these plans is the 
transformation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces—the building up of a modern, flexible and 
up-to-date army. The latest one, Armed Forces Development Plan, is being developed as 
an output from the guidance contained in the 2010 FSR. It focuses on “building a single 
set of forces with balanced capabilities across all components, to address the entire 
spectrum of tasks arising from the expected scenarios and analyses of the military-
strategic security environment and its progression.”104 
Missing from the Bulgarian defense planning system is the under-development of 
institutional linkage between operational planning and national defense planning. It lacks 
institutionalized operational planning and analysis inputs, as well as reliable models to 
determine system or platform life-cycle costs.105 In general, the Bulgarian Defense 
Planning System is considered to be in the process of development amongst the new 
NATO countries. 
2. Romania 
The Romanian defence planning system is presented as a relatively successful 
system. In the Romanian case, a threat-based planning methodology is being used, but 
there are initiatives to introduce the capability-based planning system and some progress 
was made in the development of this system. According to CCMR experts: 
Romania has more than merely the basic elements of a Western defense 
policy, planning, and execution system; but some critical tools and 
procedures are lacking and remain to be adopted. Also, key defense policy 
documents are dated and lack suitable context in order to enable effective 
planning.106 
                                                 
103 “Status of Defense Policy, Planning and Programming in the Republic of Bulgaria,” CCMR 
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104 Bulgarian MoD, White Paper on Defense and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, White 
Paper (Sofia: Bulgarian MoD, 2010), 34–35. 
105 Ibid., 1. 
106 “Status of Defense Policy, Planning, and Execution in Romania,” CCMR Report (24–25 
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The Romanian defense planning system is developing into a system that is more 
compatible to NATO nations’ and is now taking steps to prepare for the rigors of NATO 
force planning. This involves improving decision making explicitly to link Romania’s 
responsibilities with the country’s limited resources.  
The Romanian defense planning process is supported by the Defense Planning 
Law adopted in 2000.107The main national documents on defense planning are the 
National Defense Strategy and Government program.108 At the MoD level, established 
planning documents are the White Paper of Security and National Defense, Military 
Strategy, Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), main plans, and operation plans of force 
employment, the problem being that these documents are still out of date.109The DPG is 
the main internal planning document, elaborated by civilian structures and revised 
annually. 
So, in the Romanian and Bulgarian cases it was noticed that security-planning 
documents have been developed within the interagency and inter-ministerial settings and 
this process contributed to balancing and adapting each institutions agenda.110Its carried 
out on the basis of the decisions by the President, Parliament, the country’s Supreme 
Defense Council and Government, as well as on the measures and actions performed by 
other public institutions responsible for defense.111 
According to the law on defense planning, a resource management (PPBES) is 
under implementation within the MoD. This system is co-ordinated by the State Secretary 
and the Head of the Department of Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defense Policy. The  
 
                                                 
107 Law No. 63/2000 for the approval of the Government; Ordinance No.52/1998 regarding 
Romania’s national defense planning. 
108 Article 7, Law 45/1994 regarding national defense. 
109 Ibid., Article 4, § (2). 
110 Cristian and Matei, “Bridging the Gap in Civil Military Relations,” 72. 
111 Article 3, Law No. 63/2000. 
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system establishes priorities regarding procurement planning and resource allocation 
through the Defense Planning Council, led by the Minister of National Defense.112 
According to the 2008 CCMR report:  
[a]n important aspect of national defense planning, force employment, i.e., 
operational planning is underdeveloped and is addressed insufficiently. In 
1998-1999 the NATO’s Guidance on Operational Planning (GOP) has 
been translated into Romanian language to serve as the basis for a 
Romanian national operational planning procedures manual.  Once fully 
implemented, it should look toward the development of those military 
capabilities necessary to meet a range of operational requirements and 
tasks, specified through political tasks.  Nowadays, reviewing the existing 
Romanian version of OPP we can conclude that it needs to be revised in 
order to be compatible with current version of GOP. A critical deficiency 
is the lack of contingency planning guidance, which should be provided to 
the General Staff by the Minister of National Defense.113(Provides the 
armed forces with guidance on how the armed forces are to prepare 
themselves, and for which operations). 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the Romanian defense planning system 
currently shows clear signs of maturity, but there are many areas for improvement. These 
areas include: developing capabilities for better cost estimation, the refinement of 
different data bases for the support of the programming phase, and the development of an 
adequate selection and training process for personnel involved (especially civilians) in 
the defense planning process on different levels.   
3. Moldova 
The challenges in defense planning in the PfP countries are shown in the Republic 
of Moldova case. According to CCMR experts report, “there are a number of critically 
important areas of defense management and planning that require development in 
Republic of Moldova. Missing is a number of basic procedural building blocks that can 
                                                 
112 Article 3, Law No. 63/2000, 39. 
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and should be introduced in the near term.”114At present there is no structural defense 
planning methodology in place. The legal framework for Republic of Moldova defense is 
provided by Law on National Defense, adopted in 2003.115 The National Defense Law of 
Moldova does not integrate a unique legislative concept, and provides only some aspects 
related to the tasks and competences of the central public authorities in the organization 
of defense planning. In this context, we should mention that the existing legislation on 
security and defense is ill-defined with respect to the arrangements which have been 
established for the purpose of justifying preference for a certain size or type of military 
force, for its missions and the capabilities the military should develop.  
The essence of the current defense planning exercise is to complete the SDR. As a 
result, it is expected that Moldavian defense budget to increase in real terms. Further, this 
level of defense expenditure should be sufficient to support reform and restructuring 
plans.  
As noticeable from the Defense planning systems outlines presented above, the 
democratic defense planning process remains a new practice for most of the countries in 
SEE region. In some of them (see Republic of Moldova case) an appropriate defense 
planning system still does not exist practically, it is reduced to the annual budgeting only 
where the allocation of resources process is not, to a large extent, connected with 
strategic goals. Consequently, in order to implement the new defense planning system 
based on planning, budgeting, and execution methodology, it is necessary to develop a 
new defense planning concept considering trends such as capability-based planning, 
output-oriented budgeting, as well as “best practice” of other transitional countries. Also, 
the planning system has to be tailored according to specific conditions in these countries. 
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4. Defense Planning Tools Necessary for the Modern Defense Planning 
System 
The defense planning system that these countries started to look at is capability-
based planning. All of them (apart from Bulgaria, who is switching to a capability-based 
planning system) are slowly moving to this type of planning. But the uncertainties of the 
new strategic environment combined with radically changed financial priorities in many 
countries led to a situation where these ideas were not so easily converted into new 
useable tools. CBP may require the development of new tools such as operational 
planning analysis tools and costing methodologies. According to CCMR reports in 
Bulgaria case, “The existing program structure lacks institutionalized operational 
planning and analysis inputs, as well as reliable models to determine system or platform 
life-cycle costs.”116 In the Romanian case:  
The existing program structure lacks institutionalized inputs that should be 
provided by the armed forces in the form of a formal operational planning 
and analysis process. And existing costing methodologies and models are 
not providing the MoD with reliable and actionable data on life-cycle 
costs of systems and platforms, thereby precluding informed decision-
making.117 
As to the Republic of Moldova, in order to facilitate the budget planning process, 
in 2008 a new methodology of costing in defense planning was elaborated, and in 2010 a 
new data base with the most used costs was adopted. However, as in the previous cases, 
the existing methodology is not providing the MoD with reliable and actionable data on 
life-cycle costs of systems and platforms. 
In this context, the countries examined in this thesis have made impressive efforts 
in adopting different defense planning tools, but they still have problems in implementing 
them and integrating all of their outputs to be able to inform decision-making authorities. 
A basic resource management tool that all of these countries have a problem with is the 
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implementation of the PPBS, a tool that helps to ensure the effective utilization of 
available resources with proper authority, responsibility, and accountability at all levels 
of the defense establishment.118 The PPBS is not a simple thing and cannot be 
assimilated easily. The recipients should recognize that they do not have the expertise to 
introduce PPBS on their own and should seek outside assistance. A close analysis of the 
experiences of Defense Ministries in countries examined in this research on the 
implementation of the PPBS shows that Defense Ministries in these countries have had 
great difficulties with implementing this system. After many decades of a command 
economy, the former Communist countries do not have all of the needed functioning 
methods for defense management. Even as the defense planners are reorienting 
themselves to working in a new political environment, they have to assimilate new 
methods of resource management. 
There are also several missing links in the development of the military forces in 
some of these countries, such as defense reviews,119 white papers,120 procurement 
strategies and defense planning guidance121 and/or directives.  
                                                 
118 “The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) is a management tool.  It was introduced 
into the US Government by Robert McNamara ( US Secretary of Defence )in 1961.  It was intended to 
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quantitative data on needs, resource inputs, and programme outputs extending a number of years into the 
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required by the PPBS; (4) an analysis process for measuring effectiveness and for weighing alternatives; 
and (5) an information system that supplies the data required to implement the system.”; in:Senior Seminar 
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international and regional co-operation, assessment by foreign experts, and the relationship between the 
Armed Forces and society. 
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C. DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS: CONTENT AND OUTPUT 
1. Defense Planning Process Stages 
The defense planning process comprises three discrete stages: development of 
strategic concepts, elaboration of defense force capability options paper, and assessment 
of defense organization effectiveness and efficiency. Figure 2 below depicts the cycle of 
the defense planning process. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Defense Planning Process122 
                                                                                                                                                 
121 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is the essential MOD planning document. This document 
provides a programming framework on 4–6 year time horizon through establishing defense policy 
priorities, determination of main programs and their objectives, an estimation of defense budget and 
allocation of financial resources to main programs for the planning period and identification of additional 
analyses needed to support the future planning process. The DPG should be issued at the beginning of the 
annual planning cycle by the main MOD planning body (in this model called the Defense Management 
Board-DMB) and approved by the Defense Minister. 
122 Stephan De Spiegeleire, Paul van Hooft, Charles Culpepper and René Willems, “Closing the Loop 
- Towards Strategic Defence Management,” (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies) April 2009: 218. 
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a. Development of Strategic Concepts 
The “highest political authorities define the high-level policy objectives” 
for the defense organization. These objectives represent the “high level guidance”123 that 
is provided to defense planners in order to create a defense position that can accomplish 
the tasks set within the given resource constraints.124 The Strategic Concept will consist 
of a list of derived tasks to support the identified mission of the Defense Forces.125 The 
task lists are of great value for defense planners, providing a common lexicon, clarifying 
roles and missions, etc. In this context, the task lists: 
Define the types of capabilities needed to accomplish the tasks (or to 
achieve the desired effects). Then, planners define the capability levels 
needed to accomplish the tasks (or “capability goals”). Thus, for each 
scenario, planners design a force package that would provide the 
capabilities to apply the operational concept and to achieve the mission 
objectives.126 
Figure 3 depicts a mapping of capabilities to tasks. 
                                                 
123 High level guidance should at least consist of a description of the security environment, a 
definition of the goal level to which the organization should aspire, and the resources should be made 
available for achieving that goal. 
124Stephan De Spiegeleire, Paul van Hooft, Charles Culpepper and René Willems, “Closing the Loop - 
Towards Strategic Defence Management,” (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies) April 2009: 220–221.  
Also see Figure 2. 
125In all the countries addressed in this research, missions are derived from political guidance (usually 
in NSC and NMS). These are: 
 Protection of the independence and territorial integrity of the state and possible 
implementation of collective defense commitments; 
 Promotion of international order and stability; 
 Support of civil authorities when needed, for maintaining law and order, civil emergencies 
and humanitarian assistance, both nationally and internationally; 
126Todor Tagarev, “The Art of Shaping Defense Policy: Scope, Components, Relationships (But No 
Algoritms),” Connections- The Quarterly Journal V, no. 1 (2006): 15–34; see also Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   Mapping Capabilities to Tasks127 
In the Moldova case, for example, in order to improve institutional co-
operation, national-level task lists for the strategic and operational levels have been 
developed, but have yet to be fully adopted.  These national task lists have been informed 
by the NATO Task List (Bi-SC Directive 80-90). These documents cover the entire 
Moldovan defense structure, as well as all four levels of escalation.128 
In the Romania case, there is a need to develop and adopt an entire family 
of task lists (strategic, operational, and tactical). The lack of an endorsed family of task 
lists contributes to an unclear division of responsibilities among organizations executing 
strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities. The problems that defense planners 
                                                 
127 Todor Tagarev, “The Art of Shaping defense Policy: Scope, Components, Relationships (but no 
Algorithm),” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 5:1 (Spring-Summer 2006): 15–34 (published also in 
Russian and Ukrainian), p.28.  
128“Status of Defense Institution Building in the Republic of Moldova,” CCMR Report (April 3, 
2007). 
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confront in this process are that the tasks specified in the Strategic Concepts are just 
conceptual and do not specify how missions are to be accomplished.  
After a close examination of referents Strategic Concepts it was concluded 
that many armed forces in SEE exist without a fully developed role or specification of 
tasks from which they might be employed to undertake. “Without clarity concerning such 
tasks, serious issues are raised concerning the type of force requirements that needed to 
be developed and how competing demands may be prioritized.”129 
b. Elaboration of Defense Force Capability Options Paper 
Defense planners derive real capabilities from the defense guidance they 
were given and assemble them into a coherent defense force that can 
realize the high-level policy choices within the set budgetary constraints. 
Guided by the top level Government decisions the defense organizations 
components have the task and responsibility of organizing, equipping, 
training, upgrading and supporting the military forces under their 
command to provide operational capabilities that will support the selected 
national military strategies.130 
This stage comprises the following steps: 
 “Establish the existing capabilities and assess whether they are 
relevant to the task in question; 
 Make initial judgment about the acceptable level of performance of 
capabilities and assess the consequences of not being able to 
execute tasks to that level; 
 Explain how the defense force could reduce or limit the deficiency 
without major financial expenditure, i.e., cost-effective; 
 If the defense force cannot fulfill a task identified in a Strategic 
Concept, the analysis must explain how it could acquire a higher  
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level of proficiency by improving its various components, e.g., 
increases in manpower, new equipment, expanded individual / unit 
training, etc; 
 Estimate the expected level of improvement needed whilst 
assessing the resource implications of such changes in terms of the 
costs of any such enhancement options, as well as the possible 
consequences of not being able to perform the tasks to the level 
already judged acceptable; 
 Finally, establish force development options and priorities, based 
upon the preceding analyses that present the best return for 
expended resources.”131 
The question that arises at this stage is: What kind of capabilities do 
countries need and are they in conformity with the policy? 
As previously mentioned, the capability-based planning system has put 
capability packages at the center of more adaptive defense planning. In this context 
capabilities are at the heart of any defense effort and getting them “right” has been, and 
will remain, a difficult task for the countries under research. It is necessary to mention 
that all these countries under examination are developing their defense capabilities in 
accordance with national interests and levels of affordability. Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Moldova are developing their military capabilities according to various requirements, 
including those resulting from the international commitments each country has made in 
recent years. Bulgaria, for example, structured its national defence capabilities in 
accordance with the core areas set forthby NATO:  
timely forces availability; effective intelligence services; effective reaction 
and engagement; deployability and mobility; consultation, command, 
control and communications; sustainability and logistics; survivability and 
protecting forces.  They determine their national defence capabilities 
within the framework of NATO’s collective capabilities and their 
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predefined and definite participation, by Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, in NATO’s collective defence planning system.132 
But Bulgaria still needs to implement a NATO-compatible operational planning process 
and supporting operational planning analysis system to contribute to the identification of 
capability requirements and capability gaps. During the 2010 Force Structure Review, the 
Bulgarian national defense capabilities were structured in a “Catalogue of capabilities for 
the development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria,” according to allied 
specifications. They were prioritized through the “Method of Prioritisation of Deficient 
Capabilities” into three groups according to the criteria of “probability of occurrence” 
and “anticipated risk.” These groups served as the foundation for the development of 
operational concepts, including lines of action and force requirements. 
Romania as well has focused on increasing the interoperability, 
deployability and sustainability of its forces earmarked for peace support operations and 
Article 5 missions. All forces assigned for collective defense operations are also 
available, as required, for operations in or outside the Romanian territory, on a case-by-
case basis. Moreover, Romania is willing and able to participate in all NATO’s new force 
structures, including the NATO Response Force, NATO’s elite rapid reaction force. From 
the force package made available for peace support operations, Romania already has the 
capacity to deploy and sustain 1,500 troops in operations abroad.133 Therefore, existing 
methods and procedures to identify capability requirements require close examination 
and review to ensure that adequate and validated data are produced to support decision-
making, not only in acquisition, but also, and more importantly, in the force planning 
process. 
                                                 
132 Bulgarian MoD, White Paper on Defense and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, White 
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Moldova intends to undertake a reform of all its security and defense 
structures in order to build a viable capability for the security of the nation and to have 
the capacity to contribute to international operations on an appropriate scale.134 
The capabilities required for these countries to maintain their international 
commitments, including those based on co-operation with NATO, have been developed 
within an institutional framework. Each nation has established varying degrees of interest 
in fostering international co-operation and involvement, negotiating with international 
partners and initiating various programs. However, the current level of institutionalization 
is less straightforward, whereby a significant level of uncertainty in strategic matters, 
such as on perspectives of force development and on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the options, remains. 
c. Assessment of Defense Organization Effectiveness and 
Efficiency 
During the third stage the defense organization has to develop ways of 
assessing its own effectiveness and efficiency based on the results it achieves. To this 
end, performance measures are developed, monitored and reported first within the 
(defense) organization itself, and then subsequently to the highest-level political 
authorities that initially formulated the high-level policy parameters. This strategic 
performance assessment should lead to a strategic reflection on the course set out.135 
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that the most important finding of 
this study is that none of the countries studied in this research have fully followed a 
defense planning process, or closed the defense management cycle. Some of them are 
moving in that direction, as with the Bulgarian case. 
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Towards Strategic Defense Management, April, 2009; p.218. 
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2. Overall Assessment of the Defense Planning Process in SEE Countries 
Based on CCMR reports, and after close examination of the referents defense 
planning systems, the following observations were made: 
 In the defense planning process, there is still inadequate communications 
between the MoD and Joint Staff and within these organizations; there is 
also a lack of agreement on the roles and missions of the MoD and the 
Joint Staff; 
 The existing legislation on defense is ill-defined with respect to the 
arrangements established for the purpose of justifying preference for a 
certain size or type of military force, for its missions, and the capabilities 
this military should develop; 
 Steps for identifying new force requirements, deciding on preferred 
solutions and planning for force and capability development are also 
lacking. While these countries have elaborated a number of strategic 
documents defining the perceived risks to their national security, 
correspondence between the assessed risks and national defense 
requirements, in institutional terms, is less visible; 
 Long-term force development is inadequately linked to the planning 
process; 
 Financial programs were not responsive to planning guidance; 
 Defense planning tools are adopted, but in some cases the countries lack 
knowledge in implementing them, nor are their outputs fully integrated. 
In short, the thesis found that Bulgaria’s defense planning system at present time 
is in the process of being reformed; the implications of which is that it can serve as a 
model for other transitional states. Romania has to take some additional important steps 
to improve its defense planning system, and some critical tools and procedures remain to 
be adopted. The Republic of Moldova defense planning system is relatively 
underdeveloped, and largely in a state of stasis. However, despite the existing difficulties 
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and problems in adopting a defense planning system, there were indications that the 
system and procedures was improving and even had a modest record of some successes. 
The experience of new NATO members has shown that the introduction of the 
new defense planning system had a vital importance for the holistic approach to reform 
and preparation of a defense system to join the Euro-Atlantic security integration 
processes.  
D. DEFENSE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY 
EFFECTIVENESS 
The last decade of the twentieth century was a period of fundamental changes in 
Southeastern European security. Today the world faces different challenges and different 
missions; regional or civil wars, humanitarian emergencies, peacekeeping operations, the 
threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction, etc. To meet these challenges the SEE 
countries are undergoing fundamental defense and military reform. This reform is the 
essential foundation for building the modern forces and defense capabilities that are 
needed. However, the restructuring process of the military involves not only a new 
organization and a new dimension for the Armed Forces, but also an increased need for 
democratic control over the military and effectiveness of armed forces in implementing 
new missions and task. 
A defense planning process needs strong and continuous political management 
based on a unanimous understanding amongst politicians, society, and professionals on 
the major issues of the national security vision, strategy, and policy. The political-
military consensus on defense planning is crucial for its success. Both civilians and 
military leadership must cooperate in assessing their own new priorities. Both categories 
should acquire a specific planning culture, starting with a specialized language, a deep 
understanding of the requirements of medium and long-term planning, and ending with 
the familiarity of the planning process. They should also be able to operate with 
specialized planning tools. Procedures should be carefully selected and initially limited to 
the simplest level. 
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In order for defense organizations to be effective and efficient in carrying out 
their duties, they should do so on the basis of a well-considered national security and 
defense policies, be under democratic control, and act on the basis of realistic, credible 
and affordable plans. According to Bruneau’s framework,136 three elements are necessary 
for armed forces to be effective in fulfilling their new roles and missions:  
 A plan/policy; 
 Structures and processes to formulate and implement it (like, MoD, 
National Security Councils or other means of inter- agency coordination); 
and 
 Commitment of resources, in the form of political capital, money and 
personnel.   
1. Analysis of Existing Political Guidance for Defense Planning 
One of the first requirements for the successful implementation of CBP is elected 
leaders’ involvement. This must be achieved early in the process as the politicians 
generally control the information, resources and authority required to support CBP. This 
ranges from strategic policy through to operations. It is important to identify these areas 
as early as possible to ensure that the elected leaders are involved and their requirements 
are considered from the onset. Politicians must be included in CBP to ensure that their 
requirements and concerns are considered. Key stakeholders will eventually control the 
CBP process, and it is therefore important that they feel they have ownership of it. It is 
also important to ensure that stakeholders have an understanding of each other’s 
perspective and an appreciation of the different, if not competing, requirements. The 
overall defense priorities promulgated by government and senior defense leadership 
should help to provide a unifying vision. On the other side, defense decision-makers may 
need to be convinced that CBP is useful for their work. Facilitated workshops involving 
key stakeholders in developing the process and understanding the product are useful in  
 
                                                 
136 Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact 
on Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 918. 
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addressing this issue. The use of workshops provides a forum for the stakeholders to 
discuss their concerns and come to a common understanding of the process and other 
stakeholder requirements.137 
The whole defence planning system should be based on several guiding 
documents, all of which perforce need to be tied to supporting decision-points.The 
capability-based planning system, in particular, requires fundamental and continuous 
policy guidance. In this context, the establishment of a sound and clearly formulated 
defense policy ensures that all national efforts are directed towards achieving its 
objectives. The formulation of defense policy requires two main prerequisites: effective 
political control and the involvement of adequate specialist with institutional ability to 
affect consensus building. Both those prerequisites remain the exclusive responsibility of 
civilians. The military plays an important role in the process of policy formulation, not as 
decision-making authority, but in the capacity of expert advisor on military strategy, on 
the generation and employment of forces, and on the development of military 
capabilities. 
The national policy documents are very important in defense planning and force 
development system, but as Young adequately stated, defense planners should not rely 
only on them and wait for them in formal documents (this is a very common situation in 
the countries examined in this research). By his words,“[i]mportant guidance for defense 
planning can be found from different sources, such as speeches made by elected 
government officials or even press interviews.”138 
An examination of national level strategy documents reveals that the countries 
assessed in this research have all the necessary policy guidance documents essential for 
defense planning; see Table 1. Since the early 1990s, Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of 
Moldova have been engaged in elaboration of the main strategic documents dealing with 
security and defense issues. There is a National Security Concept (NSC)/National 
Security Strategy (NSC of Bulgaria, 2002; NSS of Romania, 2004; NSC of Republic of 
                                                 
137 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), Guide to Capability-Based Planning (Alexandria, 
VA, 2004), 6. 
138 Young, “Capabilies-Based Defense Planning,” p. 38. 
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Moldova, 2008) a Military Doctrine (Bulgaria, 2002; Moldova, 1995), a National 
Military/Defense Strategy (Bulgaria, 2002; Romania, 2008), a Strategic Defense Review 
(Bulgaria, 2010; Romania, 2008; Moldova, 2011), a White Paper (Bulgaria, 2010; 
Romania, 2004), etc. However, the existence of all these documents does not necessarily 
mean that defense planning will end in military effectiveness. A close examination 
reveals that some of these documents are dated and have no use under present 
circumstances (e.g., Military Doctrine of Republic of Moldova, 1995, National Security 
Strategy of Romania dated from 2004, etc.) or they are very broad focused, and they also 
do not provide defense planners with clear priorities and little guidance that can be 
executed.139 As a CCMR report concludes, even if the policy documents are properly 
structured in technical terms, they are outdated and the existing policy needs to be 
reformulated in a prompt manner.140In this context, we can conclude that setting up the 
necessary policy guidance documents is important, but not a sufficient factor in the 
defense planning process. Establishing a defense policy is relatively easily and all 









                                                 
139 See: “Status of Defense Policy, Planning and Programming in the Republic of Bulgaria,” CCMR 
Report (July 28–29, 2008), 6; “Status of Defense Policy, Planning, and Execution in Romania,” CCMR 
Report (September 24–25, 2008), 4; “Status of Defense Institution Building in the Republic of Moldova,” 
CCMR Report (April 3, 2007), 4. 
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 BULGARIA ROMANIA REPUBLIC OF 
MOLDOVA 
1994  Law 45/1994 of the 
National Defense of 
Romania 
 
1995 Law on Defense and 
the Armed Forces 
 National Security Concept; 
Military Doctrine 
1998 National Security 
Concept; Plan 2010 
  
1999 Military Doctrine  National Security Strategy  
2000  National Military Strategy; 
Defense Planning Law 
Law Nr.1156-XIV on the 
participation of Moldova 
in International 
peacekeeping Missions  
2001 Strategic  Defense 
Review; Plan 2004 
  
2002 National security 
Concept; Military 
Doctrine; Military 
strategy; White Paper 
on Defense 
 Concept of Military 
Reform  
2003   Law Nr. 345-XV on 
National Defense 
2004 SDR; Plan 2015 National Security Strategy; 
White Paper; Law on 
Defense Planning, No.473; 
Law on the participation of 
Romania in International 
peacekeeping Missions 
The Concept of 
Restructuring and the 
Modernization of the 
National Army - 2014 
2005  Government program 2005-
2008 
 
2007   Strategic Defense Review-
present 
2008  SDR; National Defense 
Strategy 
National Security Concept 
2009  Government Program 
2009-2012 
 
2010 Force Structure 
Review; White Paper 




Table 1.   High Level Policy Documents 
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After the elaboration of defense policy guidance, the defense planners have to 
translate the political guidance they receive from the political leadership into parameters 
that can guide concrete choices. This means: 
To translate the high-level policy guidance into a set of more concrete 
planning assumptions that defense planners can actually work with. These 
planning assumptions identify things like: the type of missions, the area 
within the violence spectrum they may operate, concurrency requirements, 
the long-term limits within budget, etc. On the basis of these defense 
planning assumptions, defense planners use a number of different 
analytical building blocks to ‘engineer’ capability packages.141 
2. Institutional Responsibilities and Functions Clarification 
The next step in implementing CBP is to establish an appropriate management 
structure and division of responsibility. Achieving this requires commitment at senior 
levels and without it the benefits of CBP will be limited. This is sometimes referred to as 
“institutionalizing” CBP.”142 
Thus, the second important factor to be analyzed is the adequate organizational 
structure (co-ordination between the civilian and military defense planning 
organizations).  
An appropriate institutional structure is necessary in order to implement a 
viable defense planning system. The referents experience demonstrates 
that without these structures, the planning process between the individual 
services and the development office can be very combative and, as a 
result, ineffectual. Thus, the creation of a joint headquarters with adequate 
staffing, headed by a senior military officer, to work with the civilian 
defense force development officials, will also encourage success.143 
                                                 
141 Stephan De Spiegeleire, “Closing the Loop - Towards Strategic Defence Management,” (April 
2009. 
142 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), Guide to Capability-Based Planning (Alexandria, 
VA, 2004), 5. 
143 Young, “Capabilies-Based Defense Planning,” 53. 
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In order to translate the high-level policy guidance into a set of more concrete planning 
assumptions, a closer collaboration between ‘political-military’ parts of the defense 
organizations and their more ‘military-technical’ and operational counterparts is needed.  
In the Bulgaria case, the MoD has yet to assume all responsibilities to create 
effective national level policies/planning, human resources management, 
logistics/acquisition and finances, while the Defense Staff (formerly called General Staff, 
is now part of the integrated MoD) is not fully capable of implementing policy and still 
concerns itself with operational and tactical missions and tasks.144 
In the Romania case for example, of concern is that the specific planning 
responsibilities of different MoD and General Staff structures are not de-conflicted; nor 
has a matrix been developed to address institutional responsibilities and transfer of 
authority issues, through escalation from peacetime to tension, to crisis, to war. Another 
persisting problem is over-regulation of specific functions as opposed to establishing 
general authorities.  The integration of the MoD and General Staff is likely to present 
unparalleled challenges to discern proper civilian and military responsibilities and 
functions.145 
In the Moldova case, although the development of institutional responsibilities 
and functions matrices at the national-level for peace, international tension, crisis, and 
war have been developed with external assistance, these documents have not been 
approved nor are they being used and implemented.146 
What, then, should be done? Organize aMoD and General Staff working group to 
develop a comprehensive list of responsibilities and functions for all defense 
organizations. This list should be limited initially to those responsibilities and functions 
during peacetime, but should be expanded to include: international tension, crisis, and 
                                                 
144 “Status of Defense Policy, Planning and Programming in the Republic of Bulgaria,” CCMR Report 
(July 28–29, 2008), 1. 
145 “Status of Defense Policy, Planning, and Execution in Romania,” CCMR Report (September 24–
25, 2008), 8. 
146 See: “Individual Partnership Action Program 2006–2007 for Moldova,” IPP 2.1.1 (Action 5).  
Moldova cites this objective as key to national defense reform; in:  NATO, PARP Survey of Overall PFP 
Interoperability- Moldova (2006), 1. 
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wartime, i.e., in accordance with NATO’s concept of escalation. Upon the completion of 
each list, the results should be placed in a matrix that cross-examines functions and 
organizations to determine where there are organizational gaps and over-laps.  
Another aspect in order to achieve military effectiveness is a consolidated defense 
planning system covering both the government and the defense organizations. In each 
country, as presented in Chapter II, such a system should involve the President assisted 
by the Security Council, the Parliament, the Cabinet, and/or the Council of Ministers in 
co-operation with the key ministries involved in defense issues. The strategic dimension 
of the management of defense in Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova is situated at the level 
of the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is entrusted 
with the overall leadership of the national defense system and coordination of all public 
administration authorities on defense matters, as well as the general leadership in 
ensuring the required resources for national defense needs. Executive governments are 
key players in managing defense, especially in implementing defense policy objectives, 
with the ministries of defense playing a leading role. 
In terms of legislation, assigning defense planning responsibilities to the key state 
authorities is an incredibly demanding task. Careful consideration should be made as to 
how many decision-making responsibilities are to be assigned to each level, and whether 
each authority has the required capacity to process proposals, options and alternatives, as 
well as requests for resources. It should also be recognized that concentrating too much 
authority without providing for a proper capacity to control and co-ordinate decision 
implementation might impede on the organizational performance of the defense sector.  
3. Adequate Resources 
Due to the scarcity of resources in times of economic transition, one of the most 
important tools in developing civilian control in the defense-planning process is 
budgetary planning and its execution. In-depth civilian oversight was started in this field 
by assigning to the civilian leadership the exclusive tasks of controlling and evaluating 
fund allocations. But what is often seen is the struggle between military leaders who 
justified demands for greater spending (usually the allocated budget is less than what 
 71
defense planners would prefer), and civilian officials who sought to restrain military-
ambitious budgets. In this context, defense should compete with other government  
ministries so that the final overall budget is a monetary expression of the priorities of the 
nation, its choice between "guns and butter" and “more guns mean less money for 
education.”147 
In examining the role of civilians in defense budget planning we should look at 
the following budget process stages: “(1) the formulation of the budget by the executive, 
(2) its enactment into law by the legislature, (3) the disbursement and spending of the 
funds, and (4) an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness with which the money 
was spent.”148 In the countries examined in this research, civilian elites have been 
successful in exercising control over the level of the defense budget, often greatly 
reducing spending. Although civilians have had success in setting the levels of defense 
spending, on the whole there has been little civilian control over the allocation of 
resources within the defense sector. For example, in the Romanian case they have two 
parliamentary chamber committees for defense:  Public Order Committee and National 
Security Committee. These two discuss the proposals advanced by the government. Then 
a Joint Report is sent to the Parliamentary Budget and Finance Joint Committee. 
Although this process is meant to be the most important parliamentary instrument for 
ensuring democratic control over the military, in practice due to the lack of financial 
resources, Committee responsibility is limited to the approval of government proposals 
with very minor changes. Thus this theoretically very powerful instrument of civilian 
control is in practice very we “Capabilies-Based Defense Planning,”. This is the case for 
many others SEE countries as well.  Thus, in spite of the success of the SEE countries in 
reducing the amount of money spent on defense, elected civilians have been less capable 
of controlling how the money is spent or ensuring that the allocated funds meet the 
nation's security needs. 
                                                 
147 Paul Davis, “Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission System Analysis, and 
Transformation,” RAND (National Defense Research Institute), 2002, p.2. 
148 Jeanne, Giraldo, “Defense Budgets and Civilian Oversight”, Occasional Paper no. 9, CCMR, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, (January, 2001): 
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In speaking about defense budget planning and programming, it should be 
mentioned that in the countries under research, the planning for the next year begins soon 
after the current year's budget is approved, assuring civilian control over the military and 
effective policy making. Programming is based on a program budgeting system (adopted 
by Romania and Bulgaria-2000, Molodva-2009).  
Hence, the defense budget in these countries is founded on “incremental 
principle”149—the basis for the budget proposal is last years’ budget rather than the 
defense reform objectives which should be reached.  For example, in Bulgaria the 
budgeting process operates within one- plus two-year timeframe; i.e., detailed allocations 
for the next fiscal year and budget projections for the subsequent two years, using the 
methodology of last year’s spending as a baseline.150 In the Moldova case, the process is 
based upon the principle of using resource-constraints to limit procurement options, 
versus determining requirements based upon policy priorities and supported by the 
objective results produced by operational planning analyses.151 
What happens in some countries examined in this research is that annual planning 
is concentrating on assuring the balance of expenses and central sources, so it is based on 
expense-related judgments and not on costs. But, an important contribution to defense 
planning, as was well estimated by CCMR experts in “Cost Accounting in Defense 
Planning and Budgeting: Definition, description and a generic methodology” Information 
paper:  
Is the ability to understand and implement some aspects of cost accounting 
to enable senior military leaders to develop an appreciation of resource 
allocation and budget monitoring in the planning and execution of military 
activities. At its most basic, cost accounting provides information on the 
consumption of resources and insight on the organizational priorities to 
support effective resource allocation.152 
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In the military sphere, cost accounting is used to assist senior government and 
military officials in evaluating different possible investments and to make informed 
decisions on the benefits relative to the costs of different possible scenarios. In talking 
about the development of the costing methodologies in these countries, it should be 
notedthat in the Romanian case progress has been made in developing costing to support 
decision-making. As CCMR report evaluated:  
Two basic costing models are used: one model for costing force structures, 
that includes operations and maintenance costs for standard systems and 
personnel costs; and one model for foreign deployments. No specialized 
models exist for costing life-cycle costs of different systems.153 
In the Bulgaria case there is no model to accurately estimate life-cycle costs of a system 
or platform to support acquisition decision-making.154  In the Republic of Moldova case, 
currently the Ministry of Defense developed the guidance to develop a life-cycle costing 
model to support acquisition (2009); now this model should be adopted.  
In studying the defense planning process in SEE countries, this author concluded 
that what is needed is a total reform of the system to bring it more in line with the market 
economy. The examination of past and current problems urges the establishment of such 
a military-economic planning system, which more precisely reflects the security political 
goals and economic capabilities. 
The SEE defense institutions urgently need “high level support for the military to 
have oversight of, and some flexibility in, the management of the financial affairs of the 
armed forces,”155 defense financial professionals, a proper defense financial system, and 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The contemporary international security environment stresses the necessity to 
significantly modify existing defense planning processes in SEE countries. However, 
given the ongoing challenges facing both the young democracies of SEE and the more 
mature and modern military bureaucracies, the process of civilian control over defense 
planning and the achievement of military effectiveness is still far from being 
accomplished. 
This thesis sought to provide a comparative analysis of efforts to establish civilian 
democratic control over defense planning in SEE countries (focusing mainly on the 
experience of Romania, Bulgaria, and the Republic of Moldova) and to make an 
assessment of the degree of progress toward this purpose. 
The first section of the thesis proposed conceptual clarifications regarding 
theoretical approaches to defense planning and civil-military relations. An understanding 
of basic concepts and the critical relationship played by civilian authorities in the defense 
planning process was provided. It argued that such understanding is especially important 
for the countries in transition to democracy and good governance; countries where, until 
now, there was a lack in understanding of the imperative role played by civilians in the 
defense planning process.  
Chapter I began by analyzing civil-military relations paradigms, with special 
attention being paid to a re-conceptualization of civil-military relations proposed by 
Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristina Matei. According to this framework, the analytical 
framework reviews the main elements of civil-military relations necessary for defense 
planning: democratic civilian control, oversight and military effectiveness, stressing that 
these elements are central for a sound defense planning system. Also, this section 
provided an analysis for an increasingly popular planning methodology: Capability-
Based Planning, a planning methodology adopted in many NATO and EU countries, and 
under consideration in many SEE countries. 
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The chapter concluded that a necessary civilian control over defense planning was 
established in some of the countries examined; however, this alone is not sufficient in 
order to achieve military effectiveness. In relative terms, these countries have passed the 
most difficult part of their development to democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces, reaching a level close to the requirements for NATO membership. The problems 
that arise concern most of all the dimension of effectiveness.  There is still an unrealistic 
belief in many of the countries examined in this paper, that once the formal requirements 
of the civilian democratic control are met, control itself will be guaranteed. The reason of 
this misperception is the lack of understanding that effective civilian control is possible 
only if there is clarity about the relation among resources, forces and goals of the defense 
policy.  
Chapter III demonstrated that during generations of defense reform, SEE 
countries made some progress in building armed forces which are under democratic 
control and established within a clear legal and institutional framework to ensure healthy 
civil-military relations.  This is particularly significant in the area of defense planning 
where systems should be developed with transparent, effective, efficient, and compatibles 
ones. As noted, the pace of defense planning reforms has varied in different countries and 
remains an ongoing process in all three. Bulgaria and Romania have made the most 
progress, while Moldova remains significantly behind.  The author found that defense 
reform in the Republic of Moldova has been slow and less effective, partly because of a 
lack of understanding of the complexity of attaining the goals and objectives of such 
reforms by senior political leadership. However, despite the existing difficulties and 
problems in the national security sector, the Republic of Moldova has made significant 
progress in establishing democratic control of armed forces and national security sector. 
Chapter III reviewed the Soviet and Communist legacies regarding defense 
planning in the SEE countries, with particular attention to Bulgaria and Republic of 
Moldova. It argued that Soviet and Communist legacy influences left the region, with 
inefficient governing and ineffectual planning practices.  Afterwards, the analysis 
continued with an assessment of the trends in the ongoing transition process. Since the 
early 1990s, the countries of SEE Europe have taken a series of steps designed to adopt 
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Western models of civilian oversight of the armed forces and abandoning their previous 
Communist models. This transition, as shown, has not been an easy process. The results 
of this transformation are vague and not always clear; however, the decision by these 
SEE countries to join European and Euro-Atlantic structures led to some positive 
dynamics in defense planning processes. As the assessment demonstrated, on its difficult 
transition towards good governance, healthy civil-military relations, and the 
professionalization of the armed forces, SEE countries took full advantage of various 
forms of Western assistance and expertise.  The process of reform has not consistently 
produced the expected outcomes designed by Western, and even SEE’s, political 
architects. 
The author argued that the desire for integration within NATO or EU has been, 
and continues to be, for some countries (i.e., Moldova) a powerful factor influencing 
civil-military relations and defense planning reform, but not a sufficient one.  NATO or 
EU membership does not solve the problem of creating democratically accountable 
armed forces. The chapter concluded that more work is needed in order to develop 
democratic civilian-military relations in the area of defense planning. 
All of the above mentioned chapters prepared for the comparative analysis of the 
Romanian, Bulgarian and Moldavian defense planning processes and systems. Chapter 
IV presented the major achievements and challenges of SEE countries in establishing a 
modern defense planning system that are in conformance with democratic political 
norms. The section began by describing, assessing, and critiquing the current state of the 
defense planning systems in the countries under review. 
The chapter was mainly based on the assessments undertaken by the Center for 
Civil Military Relations (Monterey, California).  These surveys included analyses of the 
defense policy, planning, programming, and budgeting system of the Bulgarian, 
Romania, and Moldovan MoDs and Armed Forces.156 Also, the author argued that the 
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countries analyzed in this research have begun the process of transitioning to capability-
based planning. In this context, the chapter presented Bulgaria’s defense planning system 
as a system that is in the process of adopting this planning methodology; Romania as a 
case where a threat-based planning methodology is being used, but there are initiatives to 
introduce the capability-based planning; and Moldova as a case where there is no 
structural defense planning methodology in place. In these realities, the reform of the 
defense planning systems for some of SEE countries is unavoidable; for example, the 
Republic of Moldova needs a totally new system, which according to the standardized 
and program tasks prepares short-, mid- and long-term plans, plus, during the feedback, 
controls the realization and efficiency of these plans. 
Chapter IV concluded that the process of establishing new defense planning 
systems in SEE countries is a slow and uncertain process, due to the lack of experience 
and expertise on the part of both civilians and militaries and their inability to adapt these 
new concepts of defense planning.   
A significant part of the chapter was devoted to the analysis of the defense 
planning process. After a deep analysis, the author concluded that the defense planning 
processes in these countries remains under-developed and not fully realized.  Another 
aspect addressed is the analysis of essential defense planning tools necessary for the 
modern defense planning system. In this context, the author noticed that rarely will any 
defense planners or decision-makers possess all the kinds of knowledge and experience 
needed to face uncertainty and still make good choices. The necessity for good decisions 
thus drives planners and decision-makers to find tools that can help them cope with the 
many conditions of uncertainty.   In this context, the countries examined in this research 
have made some efforts to adopt different defense planning tools (e.g., operational 
planning analysis methods and costing methodologies.), but they still have problems in 
implementing them and integrating all of their outputs to be able to inform decision-
making authorities. 
The author explored the factors affecting the current defense planning system in 
SEE countries (clear government policy, adequate organizational structures, and adequate 
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financial resources), and concluded that all of these three elements are necessary for the 
armed forces to be effective in fulfilling their new roles and missions. 
In analyzing the first factor, it was concluded that defense planning documents 
that articulate policy are very important in defense planning system, but not sufficient. 
An examination of national level strategy documents revealed that the countries assessed 
in this research have all the necessary policy guidance documents essential for defense 
planning. However, the existence of all these documents does not necessarily mean that 
defense planning will end in military effectiveness. A close examination reveals that 
some of these documents are outdated and have no utility under present circumstances. 
The second factor examined and stated as an important step in implementing CBP 
is establishing an appropriate management structure and division of responsibility. In 
almost all the countries examined in this research, the specific planning responsibilities of 
different MoD and General Staff structures are not de-conflicted. In some countries (such 
as Romania) institutional responsibilities and functions matrixes haven’t been developed 
in order to clarify institutional “roles and missions, “while in others (e.g., Moldova) they 
have been elaborated but have not been approved or implemented.  
The third factor examined here was the question of resources.  The author argued 
that these countries desperately need a proper defense financial management system,  and 
a budgetary and planning process that understands real costs, provides predictive 
budgeting, sets priorities, and establishes a relationship  amongst needs, costs, and effect. 
Such a system must bridge the gap between plans and budgets by better identifying 
resource considerations into the planning process at all levels. There is still a lack of 
realism and coherence between budgets and defense plans. To be more precise, once 
plans are endorsed they are regularly found to be unaffordable within allocated budgets. 
The result is that MoD has to adopt a significantly different force posture from the one 
agreed upon by Parliament in order to meet affordability constraints, i.e., there is a clear 
need for significant reductions, particularly in personnel costs. 
In short, this chapter in particular and the thesis in general, found that SEE’s 
defense planning systems, at present, are in the process of being reformed. Despite the 
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existing difficulties and problems in adopting a modern defense planning system, there 
are indicators that some systems and procedures are improving and even show some 
modest successes (i.e., Bulgaria).  
In conclusion, drawing on the analysis provided by the research and on the 
lessons learned during defense planning reform, some of the issues to be considered by 
defense planners and policy-makers, in order to achieve a certain level of success in 
defense planning, may be synthesized as follows: 
• There are no algorithms for successful defense planning. We should keep 
in mind that what has worked in one nation may not work everywhere 
else. Thus, the more countries in transition can identify and document best 
planning practices, the better nations will understand how best to achieve 
the elusive and perennially challenging task of undertaking defense 
planning reform.  
• The planning methodology should be kept simple also to make it 
transparent and unclassified.  
• Ensure that planning is a civil-military exercise with each side bringing its 
own expertise. As some authors have noticed “this is a problem that 
requires urgent attention.”157  Defense expertise among the uniformed 
military is still superior to that posed by the relatively small pool of 
trained civilians. 
As this thesis has demonstrated, ensuring democratic civilian control over defense 
planning is a challenging task for SEE countries, but some sparkles of optimism can be 
found. For example, in the Bulgarian and Romanian cases — which are NATO and EU 
members — substantial progress has been made in establishing democratic control over 
defense planning and they are moving to a phase of consolidation in this area. In the 
former Soviet states (Republic of Moldova), in contrast, the picture is much more mixed. 
Therefore, conclusions are inevitably varied. On the one hand, SEE countries do not 
possess the competitive civilian expertise necessary to replace that of the military. On 
                                                 
157 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Foster, Democratic Control of the Military in 
Postcommunist Europe. Guarding the Guards, (N.Y: PALGRAVE, 2002), 129.  
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another hand, a holistic evaluation of progress in establishing democratic civilian control 
over defense planning suggests that some level of success was attained. Of course this 
does not mean that the current situation is satisfactory. There are still many aspects that 
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